resources: papers-alice-attempts-to-abuse-a-verifiable-credential
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| id | type | name | url | maintainer | status | last_checked | date | year | level | evidence | access | abstract | authors | series | chair | minutes | recording | media | decisions | version | language | license | release | pushed | depends | since | via | summary | note | has_abstract | has_summary | kind | sector | country | products |
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| papers-alice-attempts-to-abuse-a-verifiable-credential | paper | Alice Attempts to Abuse a Verifiable Credential | https://github.com/SmithSamuelM/Papers/blob/master/whitepapers/alice-attempts-abuse-verifiable-credential.pdf | P. Dingle; S. Hammann (lead author); D. Hardman; C. Winczewski; S. Smith | quiet | 2026-10-15 | 2019-11-19 | 2019 | practitioner | informative | public | A Rebooting the Web of Trust (RWOT) IX white paper (Prague, 2019) that uses a fictional prescription scenario to examine fraud by a malicious holder against verifiable credentials, comparing traditionally signed and zero-knowledge proof credentials, with best practices for verifiers and a survivability perspective. | P. Dingle; S. Hammann (lead author); D. Hardman; C. Winczewski; S. Smith | 1.0 | smith-papers | research/papers/papers-alice-attempts-to-abuse-a-verifiable-credential | 1 | 1 |