notes: specifications/verifiable-voice-protocol

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specifications/verifiable-voice-protocol Verifiable Voice Protocol summary v0.1 — 2026-10-14: drafted by Claude from the Internet-Draft text, revision 08; unread by Mark; marked partner on Mark's word 2026-10-21, paraphrase only partner 565 # Verifiable Voice Protocol **Abstract.** An individual Internet-Draft (not adopted or endorsed by the IETF) defining the Verifiable Voice Protocol (VVP), which authenticates and authorizes organizations and individuals making or receiving telephone calls. A caller's signed passport travels in a SIP INVITE through STIR and cites a dossier of evidence built as ACDCs issued by KERI identifiers; the draft gives the roles, the passport fields and the verification algorithm. For implementers in telecommunications and verifiable calling. ## Summary The draft defines the Verifiable Voice Protocol (VVP). Like SHAKEN, RCD (Rich Call Data) and BCID (Branded Calling ID), it uses STIR (Secure Telephone Identity Revisited) to bind cryptographic evidence to a SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) INVITE and verify it downstream. Its abstract says it builds on different technical and governance assumptions and richer evidence, so that it can cross jurisdictions and act as glue between other approaches, for example justifying an A attestation in SHAKEN when a call starts outside that ecosystem, or working on its own. Evidence can also flow from the callee back to the caller. Section 3 names five roles: callee, originating party, accountable party (the party entitled to use the number), verified party and verifier, and a lifecycle in which stable evidence is prepared before any call. Section 4, Citing, describes that evidence as a dossier: an ACDC (Authentic Chained Data Container) graph covering legal identity, rights to the number, delegations and brand, issued by KERI (Key Event Receipt Infrastructure) autonomic identifiers (AIDs). For each call the originating party signs a short-lived VVP passport, a STIR PASSporT whose kid field is the OOBI (Out-Of-Band Introduction) of the signer's AID and whose evd field is the OOBI of the dossier; the passport cites the dossier rather than carrying it. A callee may answer with its own passport within the dialog. Section 5, Verifying, gives an algorithm: check timing, resolve the signer's key state from its key event log, verify the signature, validate the dossier and each ACDC in it, then confirm that the signer is authorized and that the number, brand and any business constraints are justified. Outcomes are reported per claim, and the draft covers caching dossiers by digest and historical analysis. Security considerations cover intermediaries that alter signaling, safe dereferencing of OOBIs and compromise of a legitimate originator, and require issuers to use witnessed AIDs and ACDCs rather than raw keys. ## Key terms VVP passport, dossier, accountable party, originating party, verified party, STIR, PASSporT, OOBI, AID, ACDC ## Claims and their evidence - VVP is simpler, more decentralized, cheaper, more private and higher assurance than alternatives (from the abstract; not demonstrated in the draft) [unverified] - A caller's passport must reference the OOBI of a KERI AID as its signing key and the OOBI of an ACDC dossier as its evidence [normative] - Parties that issue credentials must do so with ACDCs signed by their AID rather than a raw key [normative] - VVP can justify a SHAKEN A attestation or an RCD passport for calls originating outside those ecosystems [informative] - The document is an individual Internet-Draft with no IETF endorsement [normative] ## Related - ACDC specification repository (now kswg-acdc-specification) - KERI specification - OVC Goes Live with Microsoft - Open Verifiable Communications ## Provenance Drafted by Claude on 2026-10-14 from the Internet-Draft text (draft-hardman-verifiable-voice-protocol-08, IETF archive), abstract and sections 1 to 6 read. Not yet read by Mark.

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