notes: research/papers/kerione-keris-strategy-for-post-quantum-security

This data as json

path title type status classification words body
research/papers/kerione-keris-strategy-for-post-quantum-security KERI's Strategy for Post-Quantum Security summary v0.1 — 2026-10-14: drafted by Claude from the PDF (10 pages); unread by Mark; marked partner on Mark's word 2026-10-21, paraphrase only partner 495 # KERI's Strategy for Post-Quantum Security **Abstract.** A ten-page white paper explaining how KERI addresses two quantum threats: a surprise quantum attack on signing keys, met by pre-rotation behind hash digests, and harvest-now-decrypt-later attacks on confidentiality, left to the application layer through out-of-band key exchange or hybrid key encapsulation. It places this within NIST's post-quantum timeline and argues for crypto-agility, for decision makers and practitioners. ## Summary The paper opens with "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later" (HNDL): adversaries storing encrypted data today to decrypt once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists. It cites NIST's August 2024 post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards (FIPS 203, 204 and 205), the planned deprecation of RSA and elliptic curve cryptography by 2030 and their disallowance after 2035, and national programs in the US, Europe, India and South Korea. It frames a two-front problem: a "surprise quantum attack" on signing keys (control and authenticity) and HNDL on key exchange (confidentiality). It then introduces KERI (Key Event Receipt Infrastructure) as a ledgerless decentralized key management infrastructure (DKMI) built on autonomic identifiers (AIDs) and key event logs (KELs), whose end-verifiability lets trust be carried by any "ambient infrastructure." For control, the paper explains pre-rotation with a royal succession analogy: the controller commits to the digest of the next rotation keys without revealing them, and a 256-bit hash is described as giving about 128 bits of post-quantum security. If a current signing key is broken, the controller detects forged events through a watcher and rotates, revealing and signing with the pre-committed key, which can be a post-quantum algorithm. For confidentiality, the paper treats encryption as outside KERI's scope and names two application-layer options: an out-of-band shared secret, and hybrid key encapsulation combining X25519 with a PQC mechanism such as ML-KEM, citing OpenSSH's hybrid default since version 9.0. The conclusion argues that crypto-agility is the defense, and reports a keripy proof of concept integrating an Open Quantum Safe algorithm in a couple of hours. ## Key terms Harvest Now Decrypt Later (HNDL), surprise quantum attack, pre-rotation, autonomic identifier (AID), key event log (KEL), watcher, hybrid key encapsulation, ML-KEM, crypto-agility, ambient infrastructure ## Claims and their evidence - Pre-rotation behind a 256-bit hash gives an effective 128 bits of post-quantum security to the line of succession. [informative] - A compromise of current signing keys is detectable and recoverable through rotation to the pre-committed keys. [informative] - NIST schedules RSA and ECC for deprecation by 2030 and disallowance after 2035 (citing NIST and Moody et al. 2024). [unverified] - Integrating an Open Quantum Safe algorithm into keripy took a couple of hours (cited as personal communication with Sam Smith, 2025-10-07). [presenter-reported] - OpenSSH has deployed a hybrid PQC key exchange by default since version 9.0 (April 2022). [unverified] ## Related KERI White Paper (section 9.2, post-quantum security); Secure Privacy Authenticity Confidentiality (SPAC); keripy. ## Provenance Drafted by Claude on 2026-10-14 from the PDF, all ten pages read in full except the works cited list. Not yet read by Mark.

Links from other tables