notes: research/papers/kerione-keri-white-paper-slide-deck

This data as json

path title type status classification words body
research/papers/kerione-keri-white-paper-slide-deck Key Event Receipt Infrastructure: A Secure Identifier Overlay for the Internet summary v0.1 — 2026-10-14: drafted by Claude from the PDF (208 slides); unread by Mark; marked partner on Mark's word 2026-10-21, paraphrase only partner 460 # Key Event Receipt Infrastructure: A Secure Identifier Overlay for the Internet **Abstract.** A 208-slide overview deck (version 2.60) that accompanies the KERI white paper, covering the secure attribution problem, self-certifying identifiers, trust bases, delegation, verifiable data registries, event formats, witness agreement, security considerations and CESR encoding. It suits readers who want the white paper's argument in diagrams before reading the full paper. ## Summary The deck opens with the secure attribution problem: replacing a human basis of trust ("in person") with a cryptographic root of trust based on verifiable digital signatures. It describes KERI (Key Event Receipt Infrastructure) as "the Platypus of the identity space" (slide 7), a combination of features drawn from DNS/CA (Domain Name System and certificate authorities), PGP and blockchains, and lists its properties in "KERI for Short" (slide 11): open source under Apache 2, self-certifying identifiers, end-verifiable authenticity, pre-rotation, multi-signature and weighted multi-signature, delegated identifiers, and support for GDPR and e-signature compliance. The first block covers self-certifying identifier (SCID) derivations (basic, self-addressing, multi-signature, delegated, self-signing), inconsistency versus duplicity and the duplicity game, autonomic identifiers (AIDs) and namespaces, and three trust bases (administrative, algorithmic, autonomic). It then covers Zooko's trilemma, the unified identifier model with the AID|LID couplet, the KERI stack, decentralized key management infrastructure (DKMI) with univalent, bivalent and multivalent delegation, and verifiable credential registries built on transaction event logs (TELs). Middle slides cover the internet hourglass, platform-locked trust, issuer-holder-verifier models, key event messages, chaining, establishment and non-establishment events, seals, pre-rotation, ledger attack vectors, the direct and indirect replay modes, live and dead exploits, witnessing rules, and KA2CE (KERI's Agreement Algorithm for Control Establishment) with example thresholds. The closing blocks give generic event formats, discovery over DNS and distributed hash tables, certificate transparency, five "macro" security considerations, and an introduction to CESR (Composable Event Streaming Representation) with archival and legal-signature uses. ## Key terms secure attribution, self-certifying identifier (SCID), autonomic identifier (AID), trust basis, duplicity, pre-rotation, delegation, KA2CE, witness, key event receipt log (KERL), CESR ## Claims and their evidence - Secure attribution requires safety but not liveness or total ordering (slide 177). [informative] - Under a ledger, compromised keys cannot be recovered; under KERI, recovery is possible (slide 101, 'Apples-to-Apples'). [informative] - KERI supports compliance with GDPR and electronic signature laws (eIDAS, UETA, E-SIGN) (slide 11). [informative] - A KERL is already in a form that provides data integrity, security and traceability for archival (slides 205-206). [informative] ## Related KERI White Paper; The Duplicity Game; CESR (Composable Event Streaming Representation) overview deck; Universal Identifier Theory with KERI. ## Provenance Drafted by Claude on 2026-10-14 from the PDF, version 2.60 (2021-04-23), read through the title of every slide and the text of selected slides (1, 7, 11, 37, 101, 122). Not yet read by Mark.

Links from other tables