IANA Well-Known URI Registration: oobi
This document is a draft request to register the oobi suffix in the IANA
Well-Known URIs registry, per RFC 8615.
How to submit
The registry is governed by RFC 8615 under a Specification Required policy with expert review. A request may be filed by either route:
- GitHub (preferred): open an issue at https://github.com/protocol-registries/well-known-uris containing the completed template below.
- Email: send the completed template to
wellknown-uri-review@ietf.orgwith a subject such as "Request for well-known URI: oobi".
The current registry contents are at https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris.
Registration template (RFC 8615 §3.1)
URI suffix:
oobi
Change controller: Trust over IP Foundation (Key Event Receipt Infrastructure specification editors).
Specification document(s): Key Event Receipt Infrastructure (KERI), Annex A, section "Out-Of-Band-Introduction (OOBI)", subsection "Well-Known OOBI".
- Latest draft / source: https://github.com/trustoverip/kswg-keri-specification
- Versioned release (DOI): https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18887102
The "Well-Known OOBI" subsection defines the value oobi as a well-known URI:
a path of the form /.well-known/oobi/{aid}, where {aid} is a KERI Autonomic
Identifier (AID). An HTTP GET against this path returns either an
Out-Of-Band Introduction (OOBI) for the given AID or a redirection to the
target URL where the OOBI can be found. The response body, when present, is a
CESR-compatible serialization (such as JSON, CBOR, MGPK, or native CESR).
Status: provisional
Related information:
- Applicable URI schemes:
httpandhttps(the RFC 8615 defaults). Hosts provisioning the suffix are expected to make responses reachable over both. - The request is unauthenticated and the response is untrusted at the transport layer. An OOBI carries no cryptographic authentication of its own; any material obtained by resolving a well-known OOBI URL must be verified in-band (for KERI AIDs, via the Best-Available-Data-Acceptance (BADA) policy) before it is acted upon. Consequently, a forged OOBI cannot poison a verified endpoint cache; the residual attack surface is denial-of-service.
- Related specifications: Composable Event Streaming Representation (CESR), https://github.com/trustoverip/kswg-cesr-specification; Authentic Chained Data Container (ACDC), https://github.com/trustoverip/kswg-acdc-specification.