Internet Safety with KERI Invasion Percolation Discovery OOBIs (Out-Of-Band-Introductions) Spanning Trust Layer semiooe RERI
User Permissioned (web-of-trust) Percolated Discovery
Invasion-Percolation Graph Theory for attack resistance : - : % It pstacr gk pesge_pecolton L [ ——————————— LR A ——
Percolation Theory uses graph theory to model the rate and extent of information flow by
pair-wise or n-wise sharing of information. No global lookup. Weak and Strong Links etc.
If network enables percolation and is spanned then all information is eventually available everywhere
Primary Result (nvasion-Percolation): Eventually information fills (invades) all honest nodes in the graph whenever “capillary force® (authenticity) is greater for good information over bad information. User permissioning means honest nodes self-isolate dishonest-nodes.
Each honest user forms identity graph of other honest nodes it interacts with that forms web-of-trust anchoring
percolation discovery network.
User Permission Percolated Discovery Insight: Need-to-know just-in-time discovery (NTK-JIT) Issuer may provide upon demand at issuance all information an Issuee (Holder) needs to verify the issuance. Now Holder has discovered by percolation what it needs-to-know (NTK) just- in-time (JTK) to verify. Holder now may provide upon demand at presentation all information any verifier needs to to verify the presentation. Now verifier has discovered by percolation what it needs-to-know (NTK) just-in-time (JTK) to verify. This includes all the percolated discovery from Issuer to Holder. Likewise the Verifier may imbue on a NTK-JIT basis any subsequent use of that information with all the percolated discovery information it already received from the Holder plus any other information the Verifier needs to contribute. KERI End-Verifiability means zero-trust in the percolation path. Discovery becomes an availability not a security problem.
User Permission Percolated Discovery SPED (Speedy Percolated Endpoint Discovery) Privacy preserving or public discovery as needed User permissioned & totally decentralized Replaces or Augments User Permissioned DHT Watcher Network may provide super Nodes for aggregated discovery if desirable End-to-end verifiability means any discovery source is as good as any other. End verifiable “truth” is still true from whatever source it may have come. This enables secure bootstrap of discovery from any source on a NTK JIT basis. No need for a globally trusted discovery bootstrap resolver
Zero Trust Percolated Discovery
Primary Discovery Data are Endpoints of KERI Components:
Controllers, Agents, Backers (Witness, Registrar), Watchers, Jurors, Judges, Forwarders
Endpoint is URL: IP Scheme, Host, Port, Path etc Data Model for Securely Managing EndPoint Data
Controller (Principal AID)
Authorizes a Component to act as Player in Role
Player is AID of Component Controller
Role is purpose or function such as Watcher Zero Trust Data as Authorization in context of KERI KeyState
ACDC Issue Revoke Reissue model
RUN model (Read, Update, Nullify)
Anchored or Signed with replay and deletion attack protection
Safe Internet Use Minimally Sufficient Means Leverage existing internet but safely, with end-verifiability Internet DNS/CA is out-of-band w.r.t. KERI security Use DSN/CA for out-of-band introductions w.r.t. KERI only, not authentication Use IP addresses (128.187.16.184) for communication
OOBI (Out-Of-Band-Introduction) How to use DNS safely! Vaccuous discovery of service endpoints. Basic 00BI=Urland AIDSimple enough for QR Code Variant: Use query string to label endpoint to be discovered. Well-Known Variant: Result of well-known request is target URL o redirection
OOBI (Out-Of-Band-Introduction) How to use DNS safely! Vacuuous discovery of service endpoints. Basic 008l =Urland AID Simple enough for QR Code Variant: Use query string to label endpoint to be discovered. Well-Known Variant: Result of well-known request is target URL or redirection Any OOBI may forward to another OOBI. This is safe because the eventual endpoint is end-verifiable (authenticated).
OOBI (Out-Of-Band-Introduction)
Verbose OOBI Multi-OOBI !
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Abare URL but no AID may be used as a bare OOBI for blind or self introductions. Querying that bare URL (OOBI) may return o result in a default target OOBI or default target endpoint reply. This provides a mechanism for self-introduction, self 00BI (SOOBI) or blind-introduction, blind O0BI (BOOBI) . http://8.8.5.7:8080fo0bi http:/flocalhost:8080foobi™ htp://8.8.5.7:8080/00birole=controller&name=eve htp:/flocalhost:8080/oobitrole=controller&name=eve By default the result of get request to this OOBI URL could be another OOBI with an AID that is the ‘self* AID of the node providing the bare OOBI endpoint or the actual authenticatable ‘self endpoint withits AID or default set of authenticatable endpoints. Useful to bootstrap components in an infrastructure where the target URLs do not use a public DNS address but use instead something more secure like an explicit public IP address or a private IP or private DNS address. Aself introduction provides a bootstrap mechanism similar to a hostname configuration file with the exception that in the 00BI case the AID s ot in the configuration file just the bare OOBI URL and the given node queries that bare OOBI to get the target endpoint AID. This allows bootstrap using bare IP addresses in systems where the IP infrastructure is more securely managed than public DNS or where some other Out-Of-Band-Authentication (OOBA) mechanism is used in concert.
Because the O0BI does not expose an AID, the the resultant response when querying the OOBI may depend on other factors such as the source IP of the querier (requester) andjor another out-of-band-authentication (OOBA) mechanism. This supports private bootstrap of infrastructure.
Of course one could argue that this is just kicking the can down the road but IP addresses are correlatable and a blind (00BI can leverage IP infrastructure for discovery when useful in combination with some other OOBA mechanism without unnecessary correlation.
‘Onion Routing with Blind OCBI
did-comm with Blind OOBI
Attack Protection Replay Attack: Replay of Authenticated (signed) Data TEL (ACDC) VDR lIssue Revoke (kel anchored tel events) Heavyweight Non TEL based: Best Available Data Model (BADA) KEL anchored ordered data KeyState-DateTime of signature ordered data. Deletion Attack Total erasure a security problem (GDPR flaw) Once erased any stale authenticated data acting as authorization may be replayed without detection. Mitigation for Deletion attack are redundant signed copies (eventually consistent DB)
BADA (Best Available Data Acceptance) Policy Authentic Data: Two primary attacks: Replay attack: Mitigation: Monotonicity Deletion attack: Mitigation: Redundancy Replay Monotonicity: Interactive: Nonce Non-interactive: Memory (sequence number, date-time stamp, nullification) More scalable 7 & 4
BADA Rules Rules for Update : (anchored to key state in KEL) Accept if no prior record. Accept if anchor is later than prior record. Rules for Update: (signed by keys given by key state in KEL, ephemeral identifiers have constant key state) Accept if no prior record. Accept if key state is later than prior record. Accept if key state is the same and date-time stamp is later than prior record.
RUN off the CRUD
Client-Server API or Peer-to-Peer. Create, Read, Update, Delete (CRUD) Read, Update, Nullify (RUN) Decentralized control means server never creates only client. Client (Peer) updates server (other Peer) always for data sourced by Client (Peer). 5o no Create. Nonvinteractive monotonicity means we can't ever delete. 5010 Delete. We must Nullfy instead. Nullify is a special type of Update. Ways to Nullfy:
null value
flag indicating nullified
EndPoint Disclosue Datetime stamped BADA authorization by CID of EID in Role (Update) Datetime stamped BADA deauthorization by CID of EID in Role (Nullify) Datetime stamped BADA authorization by EID of URL for scheme (Update). Datetime stamped BADA deauthorization by EID of URL for scheme (Nullify)
The Internet Protocol (IP) is bro-ken because it has no security layer. isn vtain oot Tt onane Instead ... We use bolt-on identity system security overlays. (DNS-CA...)
Identity System Security Overlay Establish authenticity of IP packet’s message payload. Key-pair <] identity system mapping <~ identfier | Authentic Message [ controller Verifable Payload H— identifier | data signature / identity \, (Bgng) System (Fmrm = = @@ 1 | binding Soeuly binding f overlay X The overlay’s security is contingent I \ on the mapping’s security. | key-pair <—~|binding < identifier Identifier Issuance
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Identity System Security Overlay N7 N
Spanning Layer B (=) (o N e/ /o e\
Hourglass —D> < All Necessary Applications —————————————{> <I<I—— Fewer Applications . ‘Spanring Layer S <t Weaker fewer applications) <w— | <+—————————— AllPossible Supports ——————————£> | —> More Supports
Platform Locked Trust e iz oty T o | lesen | fopleion et | T | e | Doman1 | Domanz “ Domain 3 Trust Domain Based s Ovetay 1| st Ovetey 2 | TstOvetay 3 . r T ] e ==l | P | oo | Brn | < - 4 N, e s \ / ~ A up— ~_ \ /- TP uoe N L~ [ P yaems —/ N T~ el - / \ ~ J - - / \ ~ / s\ Each trust layer only spans platform specific applications N Bifurcates the internet trust map No spanning trust layer }