) HO Key Event Receipt Infrastructure A Trust Spanning Layer for the Internet https://keri.one Samuel M. Smith Ph.D. Senior Member IEEE 2021/10/21
Resources Documentation: https:/fkeri.onefkeri-resources/ https:/farxiv.orglabs/1907.02143 (KERI White Paper) Community: (meetings, open source code, IETF internet drafts) https://github.com/WebOfTrust https://github.com/WebOfTrust/keri GLEIF: https:/jwww.gleif.org/en/lei-solutions/gleifs-digital-strategy-for-the-leifintroducing-the-verifiable-lei-vlei
The Legal Entity Identifier — the LEI B LE = The LElis a life-long code owned by the respective legal entity. Nestié SA « It points to the associated - reference data. it > - The LEI is an 150 standard — el 1SO 17442, e ——— o
The LEI as a Verifiable Credential — the vLE| Trust Chain 9 LEI = Every verifiable LEI (vLEI) is created by anissuer = The issuer cryptographically signs the GLEIF credential with its private key = An issuer is the organization or entity |- Qualified vLEI Issuers that asserts information about a L. subject to which a credential is issued Legal Entities « The VLEI Issuer is an organization L ] qualified by GLEIF as part of a trusted Persons Representing network of partners Legal Entities = GLEIF issues VLEIs to Qualified VLI Issuers as attestation of trust. = GLEIF s the Root of Trust
Background References sevcantyig et i st e e e . e o g s G s [ - o e S, et R T Wrson 3, S5 oMot g o R A ——— S5 At D OA) e e ot o e b o T, S8 R i ———— T —— O S S, S S IR, KGO TWGTI 073 [N — [ ——— [t TR — [ —— o cens Tronen”
The Internet Protocol (IP) is bro-ken because it has no security layer. isn vtain oot Tt onane Instead ... We use bolt-on identity system security overlays. (DNS-CA...)
DNS Hijacking ADNS iacing s occuring at anunprecedentedscale Clever ricks allws attackers o obtain vald TLS certfcate for hiscked dorains. tkpsifastechrica comfindormation-{echnology2019/o1fa-dns Hjacking wave1is-trgeting companiesat an-almost unprecedented scalel o e — . L [ [ e e v == = : [ 1 el T e ] o L R e R SRS e == 'L;v;;hm T |
Spoaf domain verfction proces from A Allows tackers o o ol T1 certfcate or hicked dormans. i e, H, Sun Y, Edmundion, A, Rexfod,J, and Mita, P, “Gamboozing ericae uhoiies with (0P} vl ¢h {USENIX)Scurty Symposiam, o, (USEN Scury 1, . 33545, 2015 hetpsion s rgleonfrencefusenscy Bpresentadontrge e Gavrcherkon, A, "resking HTTPS with 5GP Hisckin,” Blackia, 2015 htpsihwlackvt. comdocss 1 mstrialsus 1. Gavrichenkow Sresking HTTPS Wit BGP Hiscking AS path poisoning - Vulnerability of domains: sub-prefix attacks ()= S ¥(—(‘.} \oun 22202 AnyAScan 2 28% of Domains Unaffected . i - Sesen aunch T ~a " J T e it ooks ® Onlyprefix § 729 of Domains Vulnerable » + Connectity preserved lengthsless 5 e . 24 amostany ns an than /24 g \ / peram vunerable g, - Vory sty (fitering) g Lcan getto 222024 Pariectseup o narcept & B roun AS 4 i win ol i e 1P Prefix Length
Identity System Security Overlay N7 N
Spanning Layer o) () (som) T N e E ] N/ (@) (ouc) m{ ,,/ (Tanceons) e sapre [ B () ) () MM‘ D B = = \ S e
Hourglass —D> < All Necessary Applications —————————————{> <I<I—— Fewer Applications — o ‘Spanring Layer S <t Weaker fewer applications) <w— | <+—————————— AllPossible Supports ——————————£> | —> More Supports httpsifcacm.acm.orgimagazines201917(237714 on the hourglass modelffulltext.
Platform Locked Trust i iz oeions T waere p——] L T = S | oomant | pmanz | banans Trust Domain Based Tt Ovry 1| s Ovrty? | Tt Ovetay . r ] e == | Pk | Gge | B | e \ \ / / ~—— ™~ \ / e TeP uop ~ \ e N ~— L~ [ | v 7 N = _— / AN ~ I\ VAT ERN Each trust layer only spans platform specific applications N Bifurcated internet trust map No spanning trust layer }
Solution: Waist and Neck - N =" = - - e P _ /st | s — HITP FIP SMTPRTP — ‘ I N / ~ww, ' .’:;"
Identity System Security Overlay Establish authenticity of IP packet’s message payload. Authenticatible Message Verifiable Payload controller | Sedieadd / identity \, — (binding) /™ (pingi \ key-pair <= identity system mapping <« > idenfifler‘ m security ‘M e overiay " — . P B The overlay’s security is contingent ( key-pair_j«+—{binding j«—~| identifier on the mapping’s security. Identifier Issuance
KERI is not Identity Proofing? KERI Identifiers are pseudonymous = high entropy pseudo random strings of characters EXq5YqaL6L48pf0fu7IUhLOJRaU2_RxFPOAL43wYnl4s A given KERI Identifier may be associated with a natural person or legal entity via identity proofing The advantage of KERI is that this association need only be made once at inception. The association persists in spite of change of control of the identifier via rotation of its keys. KERI provides persistent control of its pseudonymous identifiers in spite of key rotations. KERI uses pre-rotation, a forward blinded commitment to a rotation key to replace signing keys. Rotation keys are one-time only. KERI provides recovery of control of an identifier in spite of signing key compromise.
What is KERI? Key Event Receipt Infrastructure: Decentralized Key Management Infrastructure
KERI fixes the security flaw (authenticity) in PKI (Public Key Infrastructure). The flaw in PKI s key rotation.
Authorship is established in PKI with asymmetric (public, private) signing key pairs. KERI solves the key rotation problem for control over an identifier KERI uses portable verifiable data structures called key event logs (KELs) to provide duplicity evident proof of the controlling key state for pseudonymous cryptographic self.certifying identifiers (SCIDs). With KERI, key state is cryptographically verifiably bound to self-certifying identifiers In contrast conventional PKI uses assertions made by trusted entities to bind key state to identifiers KERI solves the secure attribution problem with zero trust.
Every statement associated with an identifier may be non-repudiably and securely attributed to the controller
of the identifier via a signature made with the keys determined by cryptographically verifiable key state.
Self-Certifying Identifier Issuance and Binding entropy pmres ( c:)nlro\le: | —r— / identity \ controller ' P l7—v_“ < strong ssg;:?\rt"y strong generates derives verifies i overlay X PR v PN ) v ) \ . key-pair }< ~{ binding |«—=| identifier [ key-pair |«—( strong |« identifer | self-certifying " » Self-Certifying Identifier Issuance [ key-pair <~ identiysystem mapping <~/ ideniier |
(" Demvaton — A Derivation | Yo 4 poix | . -+ praix RandomSsed | —> Stetn [ Privtokey |—> Generalon | Publokey — 1 3/ T E (4> Dgest - [‘nception Configuraion | f Prefix - Incopton Satement —_—— Inception Data L N Derivation Inception Digest Derivaton | PublcKey | Configwation | Signature | EXqSYqaL6L48p£0£uTIUAL0JRAU2 RXFPOALA3WYN148 did:keri:EXa5Yqal6L48pFOfuTIUNLOJRAUZ RXFPOALA3wYn148 /path/to/ resource?nane=securefthis
Dervation |, ® Random Seed Stretch | Private Key = Generation Publickey —— [ Random seed |—> [ priate Key | eneralin >~ PubioKey . T - N T (47— Proix [Foreomosd |- Sinn [ Phtty | Gorrin - Pk | S (+ [ RendomSeed | > stech o PrivateKey | > Generation >+ Publickey ! ‘\f\ [ noepton Configuraton—* Profix Incepion Statement De i I fion Digest Inception Data erivation | Inception Digest | Dervaton | Pubiceys | Contguraton || ignatures | EXq5YqaL6L48pL0£u7IUALOJRAU2_RxFPOALA3wYnl48 did:un:EXg5Ygal6L48pf0fu7IUnL0JRaU2_RxFPOAL43wYnl48/path/to/resource?name=securesreally
Delegated Self-Addressing SCID A Devation L H (otonsont | Sk > omtn >~ Pt ¢ | P L) { y eneration y + > Dgest > ot} | | Incepti iguratc 4 [ Delegating rofx | o Delegating Configuration } B bir oo Derivation | Inception Digest | Ouraton | Pbickoy | Covgunion | Sgrars EXq5YqaL6L48p£0fu7IUALOJRAUZ_RxFPOALA3WYnldg did:un:EXq5Yqal6L48pFOfuTTUNLOJRAUZ RXFPOAL3wYn1 48 /path/co/resource?name=securefreal ly
Pre-Rotation . Trcepton Incepton EventData S| el | nendest | el ) Configuration 0 ol c' c ) publickey public key digest| | signature | header initial next current Rotation —_ [ S| e | nendgest | aurent ¢ Roteion Rotation Event Data sn corent nex dgest arn | Confuraion 2 | ¢ [ c ubickey | publc Ky dgest| | | Sgnatue — header | curent | next current W o | retdge | et 3 c c' c Roteion ‘ E ‘ cumnt ‘nmmgm ( ament " ? . « | C c @ Digest of next key(s) makes pre-rotation post-quantum secure
Trust Basis N\ | controller | \fi B \/ Vfi / \ ) Y \ verifes bidng 19BN g \ 7 system PR _/ security \ - [ validator | Y overlay p N . / | key-pair < bnong——>| identifer | AN S N - S
Autonomic Trust Basis Cryptographic Proofs TN manages _ | controller |- U 7\ J N\ ° i N proves source-of uth genertes / 7 \ | keyeventlog | ) / " verfies stong | strong s bidng doice bindng ) . /e A [ validator / AN / R | eppar e ——| idenifer |
Administrative Trust Basis DNS/Certificate Authorities | controller | generates N < g source-of-truth ( / - database " \ verifies. b strong R N windng i . / wigrs mnages | validator | N 27N\ ) i . | keypair | [ identtier | [ aoministrator | ) —_ asserts g
Algorithmic Trust Basis Shared Distributed Ledgers TN p —\ controller ‘L\ generates / \ ] shared ledger |+ / v X verifes " strong stong \ \ binding “e’l,‘m binding X P \ - / registers \ o ’“a"af“ | validator | VRN \ Va ) ( \ strong [ [ ear— | key-pair j«———pjpging = identifier | L algorithm |