Duplicity Evident Data How to protect verifiers (and controllers) from imposters without blockchain and trusted third parties & RERI QO https://keri.one https://github.com/WebOfTrust Samuel M. Smith Ph.D. sam@keri.one
Resources Documentation: ‘https://keri.onefkeri-resources/ KERI/ACDC Community: (meetings, open source code Apache2, specification drafts) https://github.com/WebOfTrust/keri TolP: (meetings, specifications OWF License) https:/ftrustoverip.org| https:/jwiki.trustoverip.org/display/HOME/ACDC+(Authentic+Chained+Data+Container)s Task+ Force https:/jwiki.trustoverip.org/display/HOME/Trust+Spanning+Protocol+Task+Force GLEIF: https:/jwww.gleif.orglen/lei-solutions/gleifs-digital strategy-for-the-lei/introducing-the-verifiable-lei-vlei healthKERI: https:/fhealthkeri.com/ ) ~ TRUST ) " h | hl :RI A KERI & WEE B @orecrusr hgalthK=
End Verifiability End-to-End Verifiability o Middie »_ data data ) »; ~ Migde [ Middle = ) ~ data — data data o - ., ” N N End L 4 Middle ‘s data ——~ Middle » ——taia— 3 End data k) g - L] / * data data ~of Middie — S piddle - If the edges are secure, the security of the middle doesn’t matter. Ambient Verifiability: any-data, any-where, any-time by any-body Zero-Trust-Computing It’s much easier to protect one’s private keys than to protect everyone else’s internet infrastructure
Identity (-ifier) System Security Overlay \ identifier )« >\\demity system mapping J key-pair ) persistent mapping via verifiable data structure of key state changes Establish authenticity of IP packet’s message payload. Message Authenticatible Message Verifiable Payload — Key State Proof| identifier data signature N The overlay’s security is contingent on the mapping’s security.
Key State Proof is Recursive Application of Overlay identifier I >\idenmy system mapping J< * key-pair J Persistent mapping via verifiable data structure of key state changes Key State Proof Authenticatible Message Verifiable Payload [L= N Authenticatible Message Verifiable Payload identifier | key state data signature
Autonomic Identifiers (AIDs): (type of self-certifying identifier) Issuance and Binding entropy i B captures. controller | . p P controler L\ e sirong | i / \ \emes - / identity . y e/ \ ™ oysar | S gonter pa _ S ey < L J [ key-pair "™ S [ entifer \ =L / [ KEYPAIr |/ anages | 1dentfer N p < \ [ strong strong | 4 | \ g o N o y key event log | [key event log autonomic, self-managing Autonomic Identifier Issuance Tetrad cryptographic root-of-trust with verifiable persistent control
Cryptographic Root-of-Trust: Self-Certifying Identifier (SCID) + Key Event Log = Autonomic Identifier (AID) D -, . s - own oy - Gaesen - ke ¢ | oo —, $ 41| e oot > s Pty > Goewn | Pty S o ¥ Do | bcsentigst. + o St S P Green Py | e Gt Key Event Log Incepion Satement Exabishme Inception Data Subsequence Derivation | Public Keys | Configuraton | Signatures ncepton Event | Rotation Event Rotation Event | Rotation Event EXq5YqaLeL4BpEOfuTIURLOTRAT2 RXFROAL43uYn148 did:un:EXq5YqaLéL48pLOfuTIUNLOIRAUZ RxFPOALA3WYn148/path/to/ resource Jname=securefreally
e Solution: Key Pre-Rotation ull Sequence At duplcty evdent T — Sutsequenca Subsequenca verifi | notdges | e erifiable data e ‘ & =) Inception Event | structure o Rotation Event | prennt| S ‘ et retdget | arnt ) Interaction Event ) digest0 | 1 c [N Interaction Event Rosion Uporovnt] s | ornt | rexdgest | comont ) Rotation Event | Jett| 2 ‘ ¢ e Rotation Event = Interaction Event et S ‘ G otdget | e Rotaton Event g2l 1 € | € NED Interaction Event S - oot Su | e | etdgest | et ) Interaction Event dgest3 4 ct c ct Digest of next key(s) makes pre-rotation post-quantum secure 0.0, Bernstein: hitps:cryp.tofhashicollsioncost 20090517pe-
Inconsistency and Duplicity inconsistency: lacking agreement, s two or more things i relation to each other oy SRS wen duplicity: acting in two different ways to difierent people concerning the same matter it | Internal vs. External Inconsistency oo et neracton Event Internally inconsistent log = not verifiable. Interacion Event Log verification from self-certifying root-of-trust protects Rolation Evert | against internal inconsistency. Rotaon Event. | Inraon Evont | Externally inconsistent log with a purported copy of log but ol Event FE ey both verifiable = duplicitous. Interaction Evert Duplicity detection protects against external inconsistency. KERI provides duplicity evident DKMI
Cate promises to provide a Duplicity Game How may Cate be duplicitous consistent pair-wise log. and not get caught? Local Consistency Guarantee g Cate Contoter Log / B A LogV1 LogV2 LogV2 a = AP 3 aidaor [l Log Log private (one-to-one) interactions
Service promises to providea Duplicity Game may Cate/Service/Agent be consistent log to anyone. duplicitous and not get caught? Local Consistency Guarantee o Sate <o 739 Truncate Log Service/Agent Delete Log log LogV1 LogV2 LogV2 Az = 4 Vascator vaair Log Log highly available, private (one-to-one) interactions
Service promises to provide DUP|ICIty Game ., may Cate andjor service be exact same log to everyone. duplicitous and not get caught? Global Consistency Guarantee Sate o Breaking the promise of global I Global consistency may only matter after consistency is a provable labilty. Eve and Joe need to interact not before. Service Conmoti by Cate L8| Truncate Log E A Delete Lo A . Doug " lobaiDupiciy| logvi - log — ‘[‘ogvz &, | " Ambient Duplicity Detection T e Log b - Log global consistent, highly available, and public (one-to-any) interactions
KERI Identifier KEL VDR Controls Verifiable Credential Registry TEL VDR e R R w & ST e - . of | Eoe G oporios " [T [ ] ~Tomn] o] s Towen T oo . o] omn] 7] e [ oo |5 |- ; T || ) i s | S | o e 0| o o o s o [ ey e AKERI KEL for given identifier provides proof of authoritative key state at each event. The events are ordered. This ordering may be used to order transactions on some other VDR such as a Verifiable Credential Registry by attaching anchoring seals to K evente. Seals include cryptographic digest of external transaction data that binds the key-state of the anchoring event to the transaction event data anchored by the seal. The set of transaction events that determine the external registry state form alog called a Transaction Event Log (TEL). The transactions likewise contain a reference seal back to the key event authorizing the transaction. This setup enables a KEL to control a TEL for any purpose. This includes what are commonly called “smart contracts”. ‘The TEL provides a cryptographic proof of registry state by reference to the corresponding controlling KEL. Any validator may therefore cryptographically verify the authoritative state of the registry.
KEL Anchored Issuance-Revocation Registry with Separable VC TELs eyt R S . o et Ve G iy o do T T ot ion Jr— o s fints Sepe U Taracn B T Sew oo VoS 1 ks | s || Tamacin | (RN sea || | Tonwcion | (1 sl | R | fonee {2] oo [ st ] i | Soprl VC Traracton Evt s T on [ s [Tt} T e Ol VOSHe o o e e sl Transacion -1 sl Revoke | Revoked R — — Sopatio VO T T ek Comrs WCSuw o s [ e [ e | | s | e | e Each VC has a uniquely self-addressing identifier (SAID) Each VC has a uniquely identified issuer (AID) Each VC may have a uniquely identified issuee (AID). AllVC Schema are immutable
KERI Ecosystem Components: Controller Application and Agents (" Controller | Application key pair generation key pair storage key event generation el key event signing d‘b key event validation (" Controller | . Controller Agent | . Application key pair generation key pair storage key event generation key event validation E key event signing A ; J ) Modular, decentralized, web-based infrastructure without shared governance.
KERI Ecosystem Components: Peer-to-Peer Direct Mode K i "~ Contoller | " Controller | oy vent signng foyevnt generaion ¥ @ fi e event Sgning oo o’$o ey pair sorage Controller Agert | Contoler Agert | L events—— ey par storage key event validation events key event validation 5 )
KERI Ecosystem Components: Witnesses and Watchers, Indirect Mode Key pair generation key event vaidation ey event vaiidation Key pair generation ey event generation key event receipting key event receipling Key event generation ey event signing ey event publicalion Key event publication ey event signing Controller | Witness Pool | Witness Pool Controller Application — Appiication @ QD eens D fi o'y0 — — 4o I events events I Conlroller Agent [ Watcher Pool Watcher Pool Controller Agent | r— M events 060 events 000 events key pair storage ey event vaidation ey event vaiidation ey pairstorage Key event vaidation ey event vaiidation Modular decentralized web based infrastructure without shared governance
KERI Ecosystem Components: Witnesses and Watchers, Indirect Mode [ — —— - [ — oy ot ginrton o vaniring oy mantrcsing o gmrston ey even s oyt eiton Loy o ptaion ey g Caroter f—— SirassPa Carelr Application Appiication [] anm an [a) o4 [ m—] — L7 $ v iy et o o &_\ o2 o2 ’ o o= S5 s G- B gt - 7 ool e senss ovens i [ - ot owts b s - | Vostertiork | Vet <‘ ‘o% VatberFos Q0. 8 . Femd | OO0Q [ an oy vt (e ) ey avent vlidation upily detackion ey avent validation ‘Ambient Verifiability
Delegated Identifiers Derivatin & 4| e I T TS s L - PR () | S | e gt L v gtz | | Delogating Confiueaton J Key Event Logs et Incepton Data Inception Event Inception Event o Devaton | PuicKey | Conunton | St Rotation Event Roaton Event [, Rotation Event | | Rotation Event | Rotation Event Rotation Event EXq5YqaL6L48p£0fuTIUALOJRAUZ_RXFPOAL43wYnlds did:keri:EXg5YqaL6L48pf0fu7IVhLOJRaU2_RxFPOALA3wYnl48/path/to/resource?name=secéyes
Identifier Delegation: Scaling & Protection el S| [ o o gmm mm ks A Veuaan—| e 2 { o
Hard Problems & Solutions Moving Data Across Trust Domains. Trust Spanning Protocol (TSP)(SPAC) No Shared Secrets Authentic Chained Data Container (ACDC) No passwords Key Event Receipt Infrastructure (KERI) No shared encryption keys Composable Event Streaming Representation (CESR) No bearer tokens CLEIF vLEl No shared private keys Key Management (rotation) True Zero-Trust = Sign Everything Global Portability At-Scale T Do s Doman T Do s o [ i Preted rasiucre Petod imsieue Proected iasiucure o 8 - O - O 8 - O 8 =]
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