75N 6ED Verifiable Trust Bases Renewing the Web of Trust ‘Samuel M. Sm‘v'th Ph.D. sgm@. kgrv:gng 2020/10/20
Resources keri.one Universal Identifier Theory
Identity System Security Overlay N7 N
Spanning Layer B (=) (o N e/ /o e\
Hourglass —f> | <= Al Necessary Applications —————————> | <I<— Fewer Applications o Spanring Layer S < Weaker (fewer applications) <<b— | < Al Possible Supports ———————————> |~ More Supports.
Platform Locked Trust e iz oty T o | lesen | fopleion et | T | e | Doman1 | Domanz “ Domain 3 Trust Domain Based s Ovetay 1| st Ovetey 2 | TstOvetay 3 . r T ] e ==l | P | oo | Brn | < - 4 N, e s \ / ~ A up— ~_ \ /- TP uoe N L~ [ P yaems —/ N T~ el - / \ ~ J - - / \ ~ / s\ Each trust layer only spans platform specific applications N Bifurcates the internet trust map No spanning trust layer }
Waist and Neck N ~__ NN - e B /| s - Cmmamm — L N\ / Nomw o
Zooko’s Trilemma Desirable identifier properties: secure, decentralized, human meaningful Trilemma: May have any two of the three properties but not all three. One way to sort of solve the trilemma is to uniquely register a human meaningful identifier on a ledger controlled by a different identifier that is secure and decentralized but not human meaningful. pam—— Zonks Trangle it et secure puman mesangt
Trust Basis N\ | controller | \fi B \/ Vfi / \ ) Y \ verifes bidng 19BN g \ 7 system PR _/ security \ - [ validator | Y overlay p N . / | key-pair < bnong——>| identifer | AN S N - S
Administrative Trust Basis | controller | gonorates N/ source-ofnith | ( / - dalabase T \ verifies. 5 swong binding — P . / asdgns manages | validator VRN 2N\ ) | keypar | | identifer | | administrator | ) —__asserts. -
Algorithmic Trust Basis e N | controller ‘\ / N regisers source-oftruth generates /‘ 7 ‘\ | shared ledger |~/ \ / v verfies e s g N H - N / registers \ menages validator | VS \ VAN ) | keypair oS —— identifer | algorithm |
Autonomic Trust Basis N | controller | e yd \ J N\ e proves source-oftruth | - genertes / '\ | key eventlog |~ Y |4 verifies strong ! strong \ binding derives binding P N / pr:ves \ B | validator | Ve N\ \ / N\ | keypair e gror® ——>| identiier | \ ,,/' \ /
KEY Event Based Provenance of Identifiers
KERI enables cryptographic proof-of-control-authority (provenance) for each identifier.
A proof is in the form of an identifier’s key event receipt log (KERL). KERLs are End Verifiable:
End user alone may verify. Zero trust in intervening infrastructure. KERLs may be Ambient Verifiable:
Anyone may verify anylog, anywhere, at anytime. KERI = self-cert root-of-trust + certificate transparency + KA2CE + recoverable + post-quantum.
Autonomic Identifier (AID) and Namespace (AN) auto nomos = self rule autonomic = self-governing, self-controlling, etc. An autonomic namespace is self-certifying and hence self-administrating. AIDs and ANs are portable = truly self-sovereign. autonomic prefix = self-cert + UUID + URL = universal identifier
Unified Identifier Model AID: Autonomic Identifier (primary) self-managing self-certifying identifier with cryptographic root of trust secure, decentralized, portable, universally unique LID: Legitimized Human Meaningful Identifier (secondary) legitimized within trust domain of given AID by a verifiable authorization from AID controller authorization is verifiable to the root-of-trust of AID Forms AID| LID couplet within trust domain of AID aD | up | (ap | AID Trust Domain (w | [w] . [ |
AID|LID Couplet 625.127C125r EXg5Yqal6L48pf0fu7IUhLOJRaU2 RxFPOAL43wYnl48|625.127C125r
Trust Balance Reputational Trust veracity Cryptographic Trust authenticity
Decentralized Key Management Infrastructure (Univalent DKMI) AD Key Management Infrastructure Key-pair Generation & Storage Infrastructure
§ 7|8 ;:Ey Event Generation & Signing Infrastructure
Hierarchical DKMI: Bivalent DKMI Delegator AID | Infrastructure Delegate AID Key-pair Key Management Generation & Storage Infrastructure: Infrastructure s Key-pair g z Generation & Storage i .1 e § b o Key Event = Generation & Signing % g Infrastructure v Key Event Generation & Signing Infrastructure B | infesnetre _ |
Interaction Delegatlon Dslegator Delogte c D Koy Evt S Ky Evnt Steam Delegatngnferacion Event Message © ncepton ‘ heador | confguraion | delegation seas) | signatures | CRotaton S, -t Aiion Dicion | A X Rotaton D acien | ) et S roon ortoncn | O eracton | D teracton | Delegated Event Message DA CRotation | D racten | DA+ CRotation | O erscion | D interaction |
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MultiValent Delegation m{m:h e — M -
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