Authentic Chained Data Containers ACDC Verifiable Credentials with Stuff Samuel M. Smith Ph.D. Sam@prosapien.com 2022/04/26
Documentation: gt combrstorsplsng acécspeclcaion itp e goosie compresatatinidHmOEL 85 BAESH DNIS4uHy Ny De <Gl v echens o 164 e oneken esouces ol g 145 (KER ke Paper) Community: (meetings, open source code, IETF internet drafts) s nstove sl OMEACOC- tbentchinedsDokaSontaiat e T Force
Basic ACDC Features AACDC is based on KERI so get all the features of KERI for free. Leverages SAIDs (Self-Addressing Identifiers) Schemas are SAIDified: Type-is-schema, schema are immutable Chaining (Property Graph Model) Graduated Disclosure (Compact, Partial, Private, Selective) Contractually Protected Disclosure (Chain-link confidentiality, contingent disclosure) Protection Against Exploitation (including statistical correlation)
[ myms ACDCIDJSONDDDTTC ", "dn: "E3AXEIgTXOFIBBNASKC TN T 5000PyMaKOneun L ck”, "in: "didiker::EnkPreYpliFK66ipi3uryivKlXihaRzAg]sKAnZEDIRN", "ELR: PALd:ker L BynRY TS KU LUAUAK YT CEANEAT 6Pk K L0 KGL", "an: "ZL6]FVPTL SKUPGGGRTZBABENSabs4reAXRIOKCGZ2A", "an: "Sguevd-SXgOCLxUderzullrIBITV_NHWYLIKFZngy2EY" "ami MRA3CAOF0LeT ! 1heqeyu e LU TGLYFVAIEOLL IOR" "eni "se7lineqeywIonitiiQlYPVAUSDAILINORIIACIOFOLA", } i yns ACDEIDISONOODIIC %, "dn: "Z3AX3IXOL ZBBNEASKC TnE T LA0UOE YK nieun Leel”, "ami P0ANGRKDAGTOY ! aDAEDEG" "in: mdld:ker::EakProYpBlEKSS i3y TKIXKhBzRy | SKARZEDIEN", "EER: LA Kers : Bynky TS KU1 UAUAK YT SEAMERL 6FKeKW LOTKgE", "an: L6 rUbTs ] SUDGEGE ZBABEIST 6 TEAXRZOKOGIIAT, "an: "Equevi-SXgOclxlderzwlIr9BEVY NAWYLLKFzndy2rv", "am: "ERAIICHOFOTeTIiRageyuien) tItOTYPYAUEDITLIMOR" "en: "EedlineceyulerdsTrQTYRVALEDITLIMOREIACAOROLS" )
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[ myms ACDCIDJSONDDDTTC ", "dn: "E3AXEIgTXOFIBBNASKC TN T 5000PyMaKOneun L ck”, "in: "didiker::EnkPreYpliFK66ipi3uryivKlXihaRzAg]sKAnZEDIRN", "ELR: PALd:ker L BynRY TS KU LUAUAK YT CEANEAT 6Pk K L0 KGL", "an: "ZL6]FVPTL SKUPGGGRTZBABENSabs4reAXRIOKCGZ2A", "an: "Sguevd-SXgOCLxUderzullrIBITV_NHWYLIKFZngy2EY" "ami MRA3CAOF0LeT ! 1heqeyu e LU TGLYFVAIEOLL IOR" "eni "se7lineqeywIonitiiQlYPVAUSDAILINORIIACIOFOLA", } i yns ACDEIDISONOODIIC %, "dn: "Z3AX3IXOL ZBBNEASKC TnE T LA0UOE YK nieun Leel”, "ami P0ANGRKDAGTOY ! aDAEDEG" "in: mdld:ker::EakProYpBlEKSS i3y TKIXKhBzRy | SKARZEDIEN", "EER: LA Kers : Bynky TS KU1 UAUAK YT SEAMERL 6FKeKW LOTKgE", "an: L6 rUbTs ] SUDGEGE ZBABEIST 6 TEAXRZOKOGIIAT, "an: "Equevi-SXgOclxlderzwlIr9BEVY NAWYLLKFzndy2rv", "am: "ERAIICHOFOTeTIiRageyuien) tItOTYPYAUEDITLIMOR" "en: "EedlineceyulerdsTrQTYRVALEDITLIMOREIACAOROLS" )
Public Attribute Section
Private (Hidden) Attribute Section
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Nested Edge Section with Operators
Least Disclosure Principle of Least Disclosure AACDCs are designed to satisfy the principle of least disclosure. The system should disclose only the minimum amount of information about a given party needed to facilitate a transaction and no more. Partial Disclosure Compactness Chain-link Confidentiality Selective Disclosure Unbundling Bulk-issuance Mechanisms: Compact via SAID over content Blinded via SAID over content with embedded UUID (salty-nonce) Unbundled via Aggregate of bundle of blinded content Uncorrelatable via bulk issued blinded content
Three Party Exploitation Model
First-Party = Discloser of data. Second-Party = Disclosee of data received from First Party (Discloser) Third-Party = Observer of data disclosed by First Party (Discloser) to Second Party (Disclosee). Second-Party (Disclosee) Exploitation it permsioned coneaton
no contractual restrictions on the use of disclosed data. cxlist permissoned coneaion
{5023 parmitod oy contct explicit unpermissioned correlation with other second parties o third parties. Third-Party (Observer) Exploitation implicit permissioned correlation.
P conrasualrosctons o s of coserod et explicit unpermissioned correlation via collusion with second parties.
Contractually Protected Disclosure
Ricardian Contracts:
Chain-link Confidentiality o
A e AN -
Consent, Waiver, Terms-of-use, Remuneration, etc. — 7 e o8 = o2 = o0t e %o 8 o3
Chain-Link Confidentiality A chain-link confidentiality regime contractually links the disclosure of information to obligations to protect that information as the information moves downstream. The system focuses on the relationships not only between the discloser of information and the initial recipient but also between the initial recipient and subsequent recipients. Through the use of contracts, this approach links recipients of information as in a chain, with each subsequent recipient bound by the same obligation to protect the information. These chain contracts contain at least three kinds of terms: 1) obligations and restrictions on the use of the disclosed information; 2) requirements to bind future recipients to the same obligations and restrictions; and 3) requirements to perpetuate the contractual chain. This approach creates a system for the permissible dissemination of information It protects Disclosers by ensuring that the recipient’s obligation to safeguard information is extended to third parties.
Contractual Exchange Discloser provides a non-repudiable Offer with verifiable metadata (sufficient partial disclosure) which includes any terms or restrictions on use. Disclosee verifies Offer against composed schema and metadata adherence to desired data. Disclosee provides non-repudiable Accept of terms that are contingent on compliant disclosure. Discloser provides non-repudiable Disclosure with sufficient compliant detail. Disclosee verifies Disclosure using decomposed schema and adherence of disclosed data to Offer. Disclosee may now engage in permissioned use and carries liability as a deterrent against unpermissioned use.
Latent Accountability Escrow KYC Contingent Enforcement and Recourse Bonding Bounties Example Use Cases
PAC Theorem A conversation may be two of the three, private, authentic, and confidential to the same degree, but not all three at the same degree. Authentic $ e & % g Trade-offs required!
Definitions
Private:
The parties to a conversation are only known by the parties to that conversation. Authentic:
The origin and content of any statement by a party to a conversation is provable to any other party. Confidential:
All statements in a conversation are only known by the parties to that conversation. Privacy:
about control over the disclosure of who participated is in the conversation (non-content meta-data) Authenticity:
about proving who said what in the conversation (secure attribution) Confidentiality:
about control over the disclosure of what was said in the conversation (content data) Relatively weak legal protection for non-content (supoena) - Relatively strong legal protection for content (search warrant) https:/jwww.lawfareblog.com/relative-vs-absolute-approaches-contentmetadata-line https:/fwww.pogo.orgfanalysis/2019/06/the-history-and-future-of-mass-metadata-surveillance/ N g
Proving Authenticity
Non-repudiable Proof:
a statement's author cannot successfully dispute its authorship
‘Asymmetric key-pair digital signature Repudiable Proof:
astatement's author can successfully dispute its authorship
DH shared symmetric key-pair encryption (auth crypt)
Shared secret makes every verifier a potential forger
Trade-offs Private: The parties to a conversation are only known by the parties to that conversation. Authentic: The origin and content of any statement by a party to a conversation is provable to any other party. Confidential: All statements in a conversation are only known by the parties to that conversation. Non-repudiation means any party to conversation can proof to any other party exactly what was said by whom. ‘This means that technologically there is no way to prevent disclosure by any party to some third party. ‘We can incentivize confidentiality by imposing a liability on the parties to the disclosure set before disclosure Enforcement of that liability will usually necessarily violate privacy but not confidentiality. Authentc Real world value often requires transitivity. Transitive value transfer will violate complete privacy. o & % & % &
Layering A communication system can layer the different properties in different orders thereby imposing a priority on each property. Authenticity Confidentiality Privacy I ; 5 Ed
Why Solve the Secure Attribution Problem Secure attribution of any communication to its source ‘Authentic communication Authentic interactions based on secure attribution of all statements by participants: Data Provenance (Verifiable authenticity of data Data Supply Chains (Authentic data economy)
Non-Repudiable Authenticity :2 Signed with Verified with & Zoe private key n public key Sue Non-repudiable authenticity is zero-trust