Key Event Receipt Infrastructure KERI-2 A Secure Identifier Overlay for the Internet Samuel M. Smith Ph.D. sam@prosapien.com 1IW Spring 2020 April 28-30 https://github.com/SmithSamuelM/Papers https://github.com/SmithSamuelM/Papers/blobjmaster/presentations/KERI2_Overview_IIW_2020_A.pdf https://github.com/SmithSamuelM/Papers/blob/masterfwhitepapers/KERI_WP_2.x.web.pdf https://github.com/decentralized-identity/keri https://github.com/decentralized-identity/keri/blobjmasterfimplementation.md https:/fhackmd.ioforhyiJkLT721v4PCPkvQiA?both
Background References seltcertying s G, M, el certid b ke SUROCRYPT 1557 s inCypliogs, . 4904571951 ek springer comicoenioH1100783 540 464166 42t ares, . Kshosk . F. “ceping the vl ofCenaicedConol with e <ersying pthnames,” 1T Laborsor o omputer Scence s e bt Kok, . Bk, £, STSATTP: Scui the Wl Sl et URLS,” T, 1999 I ——— Wasres, . “elcertiing e Systen, T .0, Dissraton, 00l econ s cl-erpoct s s S, .18, O Reputation Framr. ol Verson 5, 1o - - " " . " P T P ————— it comSmithsimuelPapesbicbimeseivhtesspersidanstysysem st b o (28 it o OU—— CG, impentiy e i Attt s Comping o, vl e 1, 207565005 St 5 W “Ke Event Recetnfstrucur (ER) Design and B, v 2013 rvied 30fos3 epsiimivorgabsigor oz S5, ey Event Receptnfstucun (EA) Desg' o3clos L, “Crticete Transpaency Al verfaie, append onyogs” A, YL Yol 1 e 5 20isiod i it Googl,Censcare Tsparenc” e ks rgesResscaronTransency i
Human Basis-of-Trust “in person” I can know you - therefore | can trust you RN : ] ‘ | “on the internet” I can’t really know you - therefore | can’t really trust you
Replace human basis-of-trust with cryptographic root-of-trust. With verifiable digital signatures from asymmetric key crypto — we may not trust in “what” was said, but we may trust in “who” said it. We may verify that the controller of a private key, (the who), made a statement but not the validity of the statement itself. The root-of-trust is consistent attribution via verifiable integral non-repudiable statements We may build trust over time in what was said via histories of verifiably attributable (to whom) consistent statements i.e. reputation.
The Internet Protocol (IP) is bro-ken because it has no security layer.
[ Preseraton ’ oo ot | onure e | e Instead ...
We use bolt-on identity system security overlays. (DNS-CA...)
Identity System Security Overlay Establish authenticity of IP packet’s message payload. Key-pair <] identity system mapping )<~ identfier | Authentic Message [ controller Verifable Payload TN identifier | data signature / identity \, (pinding | System (o = = @@ 1 | binding saouriy binding f overlay X The overlay’s security is contingent I \ on the mapping’s security. | key-pair | binding < identifier Identifir Issuance
Administrative Identifier Issuance and Binding entropy 3 P captures. \ controller \ i il controller | administrator J \UEV:NV \ e e T N ( Y system \ § 3 N strong sgcumy weak generates asserts veries 7 overtay N v b N I R key-pair \«—- binding [+~ identifer | key-pair <= weak |<—| identifier admin-certifying Admin-Certifying Identifier Issuance
Self-Certifying Identifier Issuance and Binding entropy pmres [ controllr | Fd ‘\ ‘# / identity \ controller P strong ssg:L?\Ty strong generates deries verfes / overlay X — ¢ PN ) ;. o~ N key-pair }< »| binding |« ~| identifier | key-pair \«—- strong |«—~| identifier \ self-certifying " » Self-Certifying Identifier Issuance
Identity System Security Overlay N7 N
Basic | Derivation — (4){ pretx_| [Random Seed | Stetch [ Prvate Key /—i Generation [ PublicKey | ey ncton Gneway incton Inception Stement Prefix Inception Data Derivation Public Key Derivation Public Key Configuration Signature
Self-Addressing Dervaten Derivation | % ; RandomSeed | Stetcn [ Prvalokey |—> Generalin - PubloKey — i S T B Pl ; BT [‘nception Configuration | f B ion St " " Inception Data L Derivation | Inception Digest [ envaton | Publickey | Gonfguraion | sgnature
Dervation |, . ) S swen [P - z - g | Random Seed | | Private Key Generalion = PublicKey. : ‘Dertvaion +) i —_— e = ¢ (41— P [RondomSeed | > Stweh [ PrvaieKey | > Generalon -~ PubleKey oo > * (7 [ Rendomseed | Swwth [ PrvateKey |—> Generain > PublicKey | | &) [ ncepton Configuration|—* Incepion Sttement Prefix Inception Data R Derivation | Inception Digest Dervation | PublicKeys | Configuraion || Signatures
Delegated Self-Addressing i Derivaion 3 H Fwionsos| > i {manier| oo - ) D . +) > Digest > | Inception Configuration ¥ [ ossaingote |— 2 s Prefix o Inospion Sement Derivation | Inception Digest | [ ehalen PbicRey | Conunin | Srare
Detatin 3 { oetaten |, S, — % (4 prem RandomSeed > Swlch - PrvaloKey | > Generaon | PulcKey A P E— e el B ey E— (#)—> Sgpatm [ ncsption Confguraton | | nepton Sttsment Ereii] Inception Data Derivation | Inception Signature Dertation | PublcKey | Confgraton || Signature |
Ledger Registration Ledger Transacion Ledger acces denter Trnsacton Regstation Trnsacton [ regtred dener |+ bining |~ regsteed ke | | |~ Transacton Trnsacton [F e —— | e Trnsacton [a——— | e ey P sussieypai |+ -(bndng)+ | acss dener R ——— Access identifier may have self-certifying primary root-of-trust but registered identifier does not, even if its format appears self-certifying.
Autonomic Identifier (AID) and Namespace (AN) auto nomos = self rule autonomic = self-governing, self-controlling, etc. An autonomic namespace is self-certifying and hence self-administrating. ANs are portable = truly self-sovereign. autonomic prefix = self-cert + UUID + URL = universal identifier
Autonomic Identity System why, how — who controls what, when, and how? Root-of-Trust cryptographic autonomic identifier = why, how Source-of-Truth controller of the private key = who
Loci-of-Control
authoritative operation = what, when, how
Key Event Message Key Event Message Key Event Data Key Event Header Key Event Message header | configuration | signatures
Event Digest Chaining Key Event Message version pmx figest ilk | configuration | signatures N _ = ~Key Event Message s s 0| oot corgton ) ) o ey Event Message version prefix| sn | digest ilk configuration | signatures
Establishment Events Esibistment Evnt Hessage Estabishment Key EvntData Subsequence Publc Koy Cont Ot Cony_| Signig Contg oador | cutentkeyts) | noxt hoyts) dgest || detals signors || signaturos Inception Event | Rotation Event | Rotation Event | incspion Evenl Mossage = Kyt Rotation Event Publciey Cont O Contg_| Sgnng Cortg. beader | intalkey(s) | noxt hey(s) digest || dotals sigors || signatures Rolalon Evant ossaga Key EventDola Publc Koy Cont OherContg | Pajosd | Sering Cony eader | cutentkeyls) | noxt hey(s) dgest || detais sodls signers || signatures
Non-Establishment Events Full Sequence Non Estbishment Event Nessage Establishment Non-Estabiishment Koy Evont Data Subsequence Subsequence Payload Signing Corfig | r——— voatr | aan || sgres || sratues | Inception Event |, o o Rotation Event ——— ] Interaction Event | . Ineacion Event Nessage Interaction Event | Koy Evnt Data Pajoad | Signing Conflg Rotation Event hoader | soals sgnos | | sgnatres ) | — Rotation Event | Interaction Event | ————" ] Rotation Event ——— ] Interaction Event |, Interaction Event
Seal (Anchor) seal provides evidence of authenticity
Digest Seal Hash Tree Root Seal Event Seal
root prefix | sn | digest A seal anchors arbitrary data to an event in the key event sequence thereby providing proof of control authority for that data at the location of the anchoring event. Seals make KERI both privacy preserving and data semantic agnostic. Context independent extensibility via externally layered APIs for anchored data instead ofcontext dependent extensibility via internal linked data or tag registries. Interoperability is total w.r.t. establishment of control authority. Minimally sufficient means.
Event Sequencing Establshment Full Sequence Suseerce S S Inception Event — /. Rotation Event b _‘ Rotation Event Interaction Event |~ Rotation Event — Interaction Event | ot | Rotation Event | ‘ Interaction Event [ Rotation Event | Interaction Event | Interaction Event |
Inconsistency and Duplicity Full Sequence Inconsistency vs. Duplicity Establshment Non-Estabishment i Soptltment e inconsistercy: acking agreement, a two of more things i relaton to each other dupiity: acing in two iferent ways to diferent people conceming the same matter Inception Event Rotation Event = Internal vs. External Inconsistency Interaction Event | | Internally inconsistent log = not verifiable. Interaction Event Log verification from self-certifying root-of-trust Rotation Event protects against internal inconsistency. [ il | Rotation Event e Externally inconsistent log with a purported Interaction Event |, : copy of log but both verifiable = duplicitous. Rotation Event Duplicity detection protects against . N Interaction Event external inconsistency. | TR Interaction Event
Cate promises to provide a Duplicity Game How may Cate be duplicitous consistent pair-wise log. and not get caught? Local Consistency Guarantee Cate Contoter Log / B A LogV1 LogV2 LogV2 will Zoe aigaer vaiaor Log Log private (one-to-one) interactions