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N [6%) Key Event Receipt Infrastructure A Secure Identifier Overlay for the Internet Samuel M. Smith Ph.D. sam@keri.one 2011/04f23

Resources ‘httpsil/github.com/decentralized-identitykerl ol o g, T 7 2mT) Dot g 3mOTC(s ) o hapeethscomidecntalsdidentyKerey Pepherione hittps://github.com/SmithSamuelM/Papers/blob/masterfwhitepapers/KERI_WP.web.pdf ‘https:/github.com/SmithSamuelM/Papers/blob/masteripresentations{KERI_Overview.web.pdf ‘https:/jwiki.trustoverip.org/displayHOMEIACDC+28 Authentic+ Chained+Data+Container29:Task+Force

Background References s ceningideiters Gl . et pbic ks UROCRYT 19 Adncsin Gplas . 450437 1551 PSS oo e G540 4404, 51 i, o . e 4t o ot e o5 8 i s i ey Compterne, [ ———————————— Ko . nd e, . ST S e Vi it S Cering U WT, 553 upsipios im0 [y T ———— [ —— m e ————— " s s DS oSS Tsp b ey e sl - [t P T — e S —— S —— [ — S Aoy Eet Rt st (KR oS, st St Srtn, 5 s Coir, . Qe S DI AT, 52007163 [T R——— LAt B, e Vs Pl e Sl g s NG v s, oot ke - el g e Reecston ey ek

Human Basis-of-Trust “in person” I can know you - therefore | can trust you AR L;/J"; ;

LA B

, ] ‘ |

“on the internet”

I can’t really know you - therefore | can’t really trust you

Secure Attribution Problem Secure attribution of any communication to its source Authentic communication Authentic interactions based an secure attribution of all statements by participants Verifiable authenticity of data Data Provenance Authentic data economy

Replace human basis-of-trust with cryptographic root-of-trust. With verifiable digital signatures from asymmetric key crypto — we may not trust in “what” was said, but we may trust in “who” said it. We may verify that the controller of a private key, (the who), made a statement but not the validity of the statement itself. The root-of-trust is consistent attribution via verifiable integral non-repudiable statements We may build trust over time in what was said via histories of verifiably attributable (to whom) consistent statements i.e. reputation.

KERI is the Platypus of the identity space

GEIGE RIS e Platypus has a unique combination of features Mammal (milk), Reptile (eggs), Bird (bill), Ray (electro-location), Snake (venom) KERI is a unique combination of features that solve the secure attribution problem. KERI has elements from DNS/CA, PGP, Blockchain, etc. Closest comparison is the DNS/CA system. Provide perspective and set expectations about KERI

Secure Attribution System Design Problem Mission (security etc) Survivability = ... Susceptibility, Vulnerability, and Recoverability Failure is inevitable. Preventing all failures is futile. Instead ... Never fail to detect failure High fidelity failure detection limits exposure to failure = protection Three principles: 1) Make authentic sources of statement responsible for any failure in the secure attribution of their statements. 2) Enable the secure attribution of any failure to the source of that failure. 3) Failure detection via duplicity detection

System Design Trade Space % o ﬂ ‘ M 'i s | LN L] Yol : L L i , : self-cortying pre- a ) end =2 s ,

end self-certifying pre- verifiable root-of-{rust rotation ) g2 1 2g g KERI gz B s= spanning separated layer control scalable

KERI for Short Open Source: Apache 2: Scalability: Designed for performance, asynchronous, bare metal TCP, UDP, non-enveloped. Self-Certifying Identifiers: Root-of-trust in cryptographic derivation from entropy. Control over identifiers is not dependent on shared control of resources. End Verifiable Authenticity: Zero-trust, key event logs as proofs, no trusted entities, no trust in intervening infrastructure, end state is ambient verifiability. Decentralized Key Management Infrastructure: Pre-rotation for key rotation for compromise recovery, post-quantum secure, built-in multi-sig, weighted multi-sig. Delegated Identifiers for Enterprise Key Management: Multi-valent key management infrastructure for scalability and more secure compromise recovery. Supports GDPR Compliance: Separable identifier trust bases. Non-intertwined KELs. Supports Electronic Digital Signature Compliance (EiDAS, UETA, E-SIGN): Non-repudiable digital signatures under sole control of identifier controller satisfies core condition for legal liability.

Identity System Security Overlay Establish authenticity of IP packet’s message payload. Authenticatible Message Verifiable Payload controller | Sedieadd / identity \, — (binding) /™ (pingi \ key-pair <= identity system mapping <> idenﬁﬂer‘ b'n‘ﬂ security ‘m — overlay — . R S The overlay’s security is contingent | key-pair <~ |binding <~ identifier on the mapping’s security. Identifier Issuance

Self-Certifying Identifier Issuance and Binding entropy N J— - (contrler [ ;0" \ ’/’/idenmy‘\‘ controller oy~ strong ggz:??y strong /genelabes/ derives verles f overlay X T ¥ N 4 X key-pair ‘<—> binding <—>\ identifier | ‘ key-pair }. »| strong |« »“ identifier ‘ self-certifying fing Self-Certifying Identifier Issuance

Basic SCID | Derivation — (47— Pprefx | | Random Seed [— > Streteh | Private Key > Generation L»[ PublicKey Prefix Inception Statement Inception Data Derivation Public Key Derivation PublicKey | Configuration | Signature BDKrJxkcRImSulxs33FSpxRIPETTRIELAPHrUL1Ddhh0

did:un:BDKrJxkcROmSulxs33FSpxRIPETThIEBhpHrULLDARRO/path/ to/ resource?name=securefreally

Dervation |, ® Random Seed Stretch | Private Key = Generation Publickey —— [ Random seed |—> [ priate Key | eneralin >~ PubioKey . T - N T (47— Proix [Foreomosd |- Sinn [ Phtty | Gorrin - Pk | S (+ [ RendomSeed | > stech o[ PrivateKey | > Generation >+ Publickey ! ‘\f\ [ noepton Configuraton—* Profix Incepion Statement De i I fion Digest Inception Data erivation | Inception Digest | Dervaton | Pubiceys | Contguraton || ignatures | EXq5YqaL6L48pL0£u7IUALOJRAU2_RxFPOALA3wYnl48 did:un:EXg5Ygal6L48pf0fu7IUnL0JRaU2_RxFPOAL43wYnl48/path/to/resource?name=securesreally

Delegated Self-Addressing SCID A Devation L H (otonsont | Sk > omtn >~ Pt ¢ | P L) { y eneration y + > Dgest > ot} | | Incepti iguratc 4 [ Delegating rofx | o Delegating Configuration } B bir oo Derivation | Inception Digest | Ouraton | Pbickoy | Covgunion | Sgrars EXq5YqaL6L48p£0fu7IUALOJRAUZ_RxFPOALA3WYnldg did:un:EXq5Yqal6L48pFOfuTTUNLOJRAUZ RXFPOAL3wYn1 48 /path/co/resource?name=securefreal ly

Self-Signing SCID [ Dertation |, — Dervation +—, b (e . 4 o _pr Random Seed Svetoh - PrvteKey | > Generaon | Publckey |t =z Prvae ey (P [ S s | Incepton Corfiguraton | Incepion Satoment cetion Dt Prefc Duhatin | Pukckey | Confqumton || Sepatu ) Derivation | Inception Signature i

Inconsistency and Duplicity inconsistency: lacking agreement, s two or more things i relation to each other oy SRS wen dluplicity: acting in two different ways to different people concerning the same matter Inceplon Event | Internal vs. External Inconsistency Rotaton Event . N - racton vent Internally inconsistent log = not verifiable. Interacion Event Log verification from self-certifying root-of-trust protects RahonEvnt |— against internal inconsistency. Rotaton Event racion ven | Externally inconsistent log with a purported copy of log but Roston Event Fe ey both verifiable = duplicitous. Ineracton Event - . . . 8 Duplicity detection protects against external inconsistency.

Cate promises to provide a Duplicity Game How may Cate be duplicitous consistent pair-wise log. and not get caught? Local Consistency Guarantee Q Cate Contoter Log / B A LogV1 LogV2 LogV2 a = AP 3 aidaor [l Log Log private (one-to-one) interactions

Service promises to provide a Duplicity Game How may Cate/Service/Agent be consistent log to anyone. duplicitous and not get caught? Local Consistency Guarantee Q Cate IV 7? Truncate Log Service/Agent Conoted by Cato Delete Log Log / \ LogV1 LogV2 Log V2 Az = & vaer vacor Log Log highly available, private (one-to-one) interactions

Service promises to provide DUP|ICIty Game ., may Cate andjor service be exact same log to everyone. duplicitous and not get caught? Global Consistency Guarantee Sate o Breaking the promise of global I Global consistency may only matter after consistency is provable labilty. Eve and Joe need to interact not before. Service Conmoti by Cate .8 | Truncate Log E A Delete Lo A . Doug " lobaiDupiciy| logvi - log — ‘[‘ogvz &, | Ambient Duplicity Detection T e Log b - Log global consistent, highly available, and public (one-to-any) interactions

Ledger Registration Ledger Transacion Ledger acces dentfer Trnsacton Registration Traneackon [ repsterd dener [~ bining |+~ regsteredkey-pai | | |- Transacion Trnsacton [F r— | o Trnsacton [es— ] o ey s e scmsioysar [+ +{bndng | acms deter sttty ccssinfor The access identifier may have a self-certifying primary root-of-trust, but the registered identifier does not, even if its format appears to be self-certifying.

Autonomic Identifier (AID) and Namespace (AN) auto nomos = self rule autonomic = self-governing, self-controlling, etc. An autonomic namespace is self-certifying and hence self-administrating. AIDs and ANs are portable = truly self-sovereign. autonomic prefix = self-cert + UUID + URL = universal identifier

SmithSamuelM / Papers-master, https://github.com/SmithSamuelM/Papers/blob/master/presentations/KERI2_Overview.web.pdf. Licensed under the Apache License 2.0; the license and any notices are in the repository. Found through KERISSE. The abstract, the level and the labels on the catalog entry are the KERISuite Knowledge Base's own, CC BY 4.0.