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Papers

repository prose file · license Apache-2.0 · 5239 characters · the original · source smithsamuelm-papers-master

g x, Yén 2y by RERI Key Event Receipt Infrastructure The Economics of Its & Bits Digital Identity Freedom Privacy Control Security

Economics value creation and capture ntrol A o M extraction, exchange, and exploitation value security

its control bits @ value ) |0||°" atoms « information 000 Wy : physical security Security? Informational security P B m Ry [e) o= Ao = N

Revenue 60 Years of Its & Bits Market Value 1960 1980 2000 2020 2020 e o g o o g e Sy e e e e 1 |@anaral Motors. M2 1 Eomae w0 1 Geesloos 08 1 Wemet smE 1 Mems 1w 2 looenwest | Ten 7 Gt w3 e @ 2 |eaman w2 s 3 [roaveie s 0w w3 e w2 o e 5w s [t 4 o oo TR o e 4 e s o fussos ot e Wm0 Gemer 05 osin E I s o oo . IR HS5 b ST s s 2 v [anor a1 e a7 G L T T T o b e PN s | b T @9 e e b e P 3 [ehmer 208 s e a0 Ao am o wE s e v o [esman s 0 e | 0 som T reserstege T 1 e e 1 a1 e R e N R T T 15 Joes s R N ) o man o [ e o w92 e W6 (s s 6 e T |t 1121 s W i G| 7 (et W 7 o s - [scn WO 0 Tstimie 08 e a6 et wE e ar 1 eoang e W s W0 |wmsonms wE 8 Gadh w ™ s @ s iR e e [ i e

Networks Effects Network scaling law: How network value scales with number of participants. TN Value = Reach (= ) XL > ‘k&" “"fi‘\ Metcalfe’s Law gy ‘;%4;&3’ V=a-N-N=ane LA “".’V https:/imedium.com/selfrule/metaplatforms-and-cooperative-network-of-networks-effects-6e61ebiscs86

How do we recapture the value in our data? 1- Retake control of our data 2- Leverage cooperative network effects

Retake control of our data

Human Basis-of-Trust “in person” I can know you - therefore | can trust you AR L;/J"; ;

LA B

, ] ‘ |

“on the internet”

I can’t really know you - therefore | can’t really trust you

A o B A o o R y | . . s . Toolkits e > e b F W 5 i e O i - - B e . e : A e | 5 § i E o = L ;4 (& | | | . i | = . L0y . . | | T it 4 = TN \‘i %‘fl/ “ o [ Uv“mufllmxfi

Only have one set of tools for truly secure data control!

its bits control @ value @ Ifllllo on atoms = information 000 dlgltal EQ} uniqueness ? physical security E n t rO py Informational security _fl A 8 S, B sl &

Entropy Derived Tools Cryptographic one-way functions ... hashes, ECC scalar multiplication...

digital signatures, ZKPs ...

Information uniqueness from captured entropy To retake control of our data we must first retake control of our identifiers. self-certifying pseudonymous identifiers Key Event Receipt Infrastructure (KERI) https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.02143

Replace human basis-of-trust with cryptographic root-of-trust. With verifiable digital signatures from asymmetric key crypto — we may not trust in “what” was said, but we may trust in “who” said it. We may verify that the controller of a private key, (the who), made a statement but not the validity of the statement itself. The root-of-trust is consistent attribution via verifiable integral non-repudiable statements We may build trust over time in what was said via histories of verifiably attributable (to whom) consistent statements i.e. reputation.

Four A’s of Secure Data Control Author: creator, source-of-truth Authentic: provable origin, root-of-trust Authorized: consent, loci-of-control Authoritative: accurate, reputable A4 data control securely established via self- certifying pseudonymous identifiers

Sapored Data

Sapor: noun

the quality in a substance that affects the sense of taste; savor; flavor. Sapored data may be securely provenanced to its author(s). Sapored data value extraction may be securely attributed to its authors. Sapored data supply chains. Enable consumer pull in addition to regulatory push. Conscious consumers of Sapored data drive compliance. Circular data economy network effects.

) 000 control l @ correlation bltS @ cryptographic 1o g |on::| pseudonymous identifiers contmll Tattribution @ sapored data

Strong Privacy? Weak Weak

Strong Privacy

un-correlated interactions over unbounded time and space.

Super aggregators and state actors have effectively unlimited storage and compute capacity. Eventually all disclosed data will be at least statistically correlatable.

Weak Privacy

un-correlated interactions over bounded time and space.

When the cost of correlation exceeds the value of correlation the data will become un-correlated (de-correlated).

Economics of Correlator predictive value 1 B s 8 H 5 8 8 time data lifecycle past now future measured predicted

Economics of Correlator: Value Extraction predictive value ] B ] 8 H E 2 s e g 5 extractafv/e value g time data lifecycle past now future measured predicted

Economics of De-correlator g predictive value E 7 5 8 b= c g £ 8 ] $ ] S time data lifecycle past now future measured predicted

Economics of De-correlator: Value Extraction s predictive value 3 K 8 5 extractable value 5 3 AN s £ 5 g g E 3 time data lifecycle past now future measured predicted

Operating Regimes o Regulation H Hide or Bribe and EH Contracts & H 2 £ Hide and Bribe Reputation E) g Tilegitimate Legitimate Economic

Freedom balanced

Freedom from ... Freedomto ... exploitation (commercial) extract value(commercial) intimidation (political) build relationships (social) censorship (political) build community (political)

possibility of erasure = possibility of censorship

anonymity = loss-of-value from attribution fairness = requires data attribution

SmithSamuelM / Papers-master, https://github.com/SmithSamuelM/Papers/blob/master/presentations/DDEPresentation_20200910.web.pdf. Licensed under the Apache License 2.0; the license and any notices are in the repository. Found through KERISSE. The abstract, the level and the labels on the catalog entry are the KERISuite Knowledge Base's own, CC BY 4.0.

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