Bulk Issuance Context Management Self-enforcing Data Loyalty Ay % s | @ i e e RERI https://kericonf.com https://keri.foundation FOUNDATION
Duty of Data Loyalty The idea behind loyalty is simple: organizations should not process data or design technologies that conflict with the best interests of trusting parties. ... Our model takes advantage of loyalty’s strengths—it is well-established in our law, it is flexible, and it can accommodate conflicting values. ... But loyalty has one great virtue: it places the focus for information age problems on the relationships that define our social lives rather than on the data which is the byproduct of those relationships. ... Data loyalty has three key features—it is a (1) relational duty (2) that prohibits self-dealing (3) at the expense of a trusting party.
Enforcement via Relationship Loyalty Finally, relationships open the possibility of more robust enforcement rules because they are voluntarily entered into and hold a unique place in the law as a result. The concept of contractual privity could also be used to extend relational duties beyond the initial trusting party and entrustee. Under a “chain-link” approach to relational privacy rules, lawmakers could directly—or using mandated terms in data-sharing contracts—link the disclosure of personal information to obligations of loyalty to protect information as it is disclosed downstream. To create the chain of protection, contracts would be used to link each new recipient of information to a previous recipient who wished to disclose the information. At the same time, relational duties raise even fewer free expression issues than other forms of data regulation because they regulate relationships rather than information flows. In relationships, parties assume these duties by soliciting trust and voluntarily entering into these relationships.
Contract Avalid contract needs 1) an agreement, 2) an exchange of consideration, and 3) anintention to create legal relations.
ACDC Confidentiality/Privacy Protections
Least Disclosure:
The system should disclose only the minimum amount of information about a given party
needed to facilitate a transaction, and no more Graduated Disclosure: progressive least disclosures that each enable further disclosure Contractually Protected Disclosure:
Uses graduated disclosure to minimize leakage prior to legally enforceable protection IPEX Protocol (issuance and presentation exchange) Blindable ACDC State Registries Bindable Blindable Delegated ACDC State Registries:
perpetually verifiable, dynamically revocable, delegable, transferable
Relationship Graph (global) S TR AR < es =SS o) H i 2 7, Y T ey
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A . Usage Presentation Registry
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ACDC Bulk Issuance with full cryptographic unlinkability validator to validator The UUIDs in each member of a bulk-issued set are derived using an HDKey algorithm that includes a shared secret salt, the member index, and the UUID index. Each member of a bulk-issued set has a unique AID and unique keys derived using an HDKey algorithm that includes a non-shared private salt, a shared secret salt, and the member index. When using independent registry bulk-issued ACDCs, the total number of registries for a given set of bulk-issued ACDCs typically equals the number of members in that set. Alternatively, a given Issuer could use one blinded state tel for multiple different ACDCs issued to the same issuee, thereby providing herd privacy of usage and state across a set of issuances.
ACDC Example
Cal Registry Inception CalIssued ACDC
[ s ACDCEARCARTSONARDS. ", s RCCRACAASON. 475 "EPolah_NE2VCaZOFETROTWKPGE KUPHASUL GYLIZDN' 4 ELFTegPUCALTGRAGOKdSaPELOg s —THukT", e ——————— [N ——— OISO T AU, e vt oo oD T e, 15h2 B AGU AT qoDSD274 e TAGKDLFHGRHALL G, "at7: "2025-07-04T17:532:00.008000+00:00"
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Cal Issued Most Compact ACDC o " ETFTegPUCAITIORENSGEKHGAPELDg - 2NKATT-TeHAT ™, i o vonztonare . . S TEPLORA_NEPVCO20RCTFOKPCE IUPHAS L GVL 70N ansta o n part WS NGT be Shared with any other snbiy besiden the s MK AGLF0CT0-ATGL- KIBDSD224 e TAGNQLENGRHATLEY, ntendsd recipienc.” "3 EKTOSCURYyKGUPRYA SSATFaRUTSZGHIXIFbEZIONL", ; e ENEfomAYgoALEETONZUKTYCNSHS T 23] 0CuY U )
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ACDC Selective Disclosure Example Aggregate Section Blinded Aggregate Element List an e i [ ——— N TR sHESHLRLy 50V 1 EL2 1w 12Krs-bOWREr eOhER- U205 OST-QCYMUXSVaAY *d": "EI2\af17Krs bOmgEreChEn-W2022rOnST-(CyMNEVA", EC-vU19URKKEZ t Audp_]ZHHF 1175qtGal YHEZr g6-GHRY, "uti MOABRYZRIc3BLY3dvemtyVicu", ""EKYLUIPDXNTBu] SdoNOT5pLp@okOKW3mADE-MTKS00_C" AR — , 5 t AGID = H(C(as for all i in {0, » NA1)), where K4t PECVUOURAXO2 2 LSt GaHEZr - GHRY, W 15 the digest (hash) Operator and RN ——————— s o € 15 the ordered seriatization operator- seoren This aggregate AGID makes a blinded cryptographic commitment 3 o aLUSATDS in the List (aus cn au] 1 PAY: ENS44 FTNMOMAKNMMY rSHOHWHLRLybGS0IEVB0RKLdXx" T4t SEKYLLTOMITouSS4aHOTS LRBGHONWSmAbEHTHS00_C" RN —————— ) )
ACDC Selective Disclosure Example ... Selectively Disclosed Aggregate Section o . NS4 IO e SHOAHLRLy SO E VgL 4 L2 12K -5OwgEraOnER-H20SA ORST-GE ST, " TR Sty VX, [ ——— N TEC VUISURBE oSS HEZ O, [T, ERYLUTYDANTu] SAaNOTSpLoGoHORmADGHTKSOD_C )
[ acoc Ve w o m s e [Versan | Tpe | SAD UL sser AD Ry Schemal Atite Edpe Ruke Rogty ncaption Event ) ) Regsty Binded Updsle Even oup) [ A ok ) P R T P R S @ woow s Veson| Ty | SWD WD umrAD SN D] Ve | Tye | SAD Regsy SN pro | Daotne s || || 810 | wp [ acocsan | s i . Binded State Registy (TEL) fssuer Key Event Log (KEL) | ACDC RegistrariObserver Transacton . SN Event KeySta EventSedls ACDC Stae Regtry o T oept | ot Transaction Event Log (TEL) ool o | et | SN Bt BLD 1| meract | NoChange | sea o v | . .| Binded Atnute Blocks (8ABs) _ 2 | iteract | NoChange | seal 1 | Upsate | .. ] 8UD [ WU | empty | ampty - 3| Rowte | crange | seal 2 [Upsate | .. ‘ BUD [ uu | AcDC | issued .4 | teract | NoChange | seal 3 | ptate | . - ‘ BUD [ UUD | ACDC | issued 5| Roste | Change | sea 4 Ve | . ‘ BUD [ UUID | AGDC | revoked 6| Roate | Change | Sea 5 | Uptate| .. — BLD | UUID | AGDC | revoked
[ AcoC v e w i w s s s [V s A |00 s D ey schra st i [ Rogaty capion Evnt ] Rogaty Bindad Udal Evar () [ orwarueon s | vt e uw o ion & | v 44 wonp @ PR Vs Tpa |40 WD seraD SN ooeTimn | verson Ty | D ey SN o | [0 | | 50 [up cocsan | sl i e Regity 1) Issuer ey Event Log (EL) ACOC RegistariOuserver Tansasion SN Event KeyState Event Seals ACDC State Registry o vt et | TansacionEvn Lo (EL) r Icept st SN Event BLD {1 ] et [ Norange | Sea ofbom[ . L E— 2] et [oCrange| sea IR E T [] Rome | crrge | s L2 e 0 [wn oot | e [+ ] mert [ NoGramge|_sea L3 om0 [wn oz | e [5] Rome | crrge | s L ey [wo o0t s o Rome | Cunge | sen 5 st oo [ un [ Acoct | s
ACDC Blinded Registry Example Registry Inception Registry Placeholder Update i TACOCCARCARISONMR. L ACOCCAACARISONAAES e PO "d" "ECONDL3kAJpCFYITReNDX2uGE-Gs6LhyKLO-0r3q0TC" " "EPNuyVHP2X]sZ9PSPXtHECCmzWEbKSFC-nhGKTbSoaYE" , u"s "GABNVZRIc3BLY3dvamtyVXex”, "rd: "ECOMII9KkA]PCFYITRenpIx2w66-GSGLhYKLO-0r3901Q" 147 "ECHIZEBELLASOESUOraMTSE BUSHEDKCAY ORI YT, e e, "pM: MECOWIIOKA]PCFYITRenpIx2w66-GsGLhyKLO-0r3q0IQ", NGt 20280704711 551109.000000400:00" e } "b": "ECVrTQWEP_2qVQuzayprRFXVx1-9ukLx_d6oDinlHUEI" ) ViiLabel Ve cescriaion . [ —————— Ty T [ FVTT o —————r-p—) = gy Tasacion ACOG SAD fd v, oo 4 Unblinded attribute block as attachment to disclosure of TEL Event aRYECUTTGHED_aaQuzyarAF 3 -. _dSoD G313 TT o 6Tz Py GHPLLTLhAUKUEIARPIARP Placeholder updates provide herd privacy wrt correlation to date time of actual state changes
ACDC Blinded Registry Example ... Registry Issued Update i PACDCCAACARISONRAE s 4 By 20CAdna - CHLSGLHG2LIGBSLTRAESNTON' e ECIIIKAJPCYI1Ren 268G KLO-0r3G010", PR ————— gt "2820-08-02112:00:20.000000100:00", 57 "EOtMOX_ 003Ukl ZSICHINALTZSYSH_Hr_c" Vit Labe Vet Descrption . [P —— R - B o ity | UUID oty nancs binang fcton random o HD gsnrted @ 50 ok s ot mcen | Tansnton AGDC SAI ild vauetop-evl ¢ 5 s ansactonstatovalu sting
ACDC Blinded Registry Example ... Registry Issued Update
i ACDCCAACARISONRAE
s
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e IOk ALY Re 2w -GG KLO-0r3G010",
g "Bl 2DCAdna - CHLSGUHE2LIGBSLTRAZSNTEN'
gt "2020-08-03T12:00:20.000000100:00",
5 7EP3521500NTHTgANSuZVYdhNeos SaxgEns PbS TCARNY Virtual Label Value Description d EPj35ZjB0OWTKTgANSVZVYdANeo ] 3zxgENSAPbf CRAN. Dummied BLID (Blinding SAID) u TGP TSS OG0RYOEE wi\dasbcdkonanty2 UUID salty nonce blinding factor H generated w UL 2L LU0GKox_SOMGaT0-OudoGHOubaT26ucdtt Transaction ACDC SAID fild value, top-fovel o - Yrevoked Transaction sate value sring
Bulk Issuance All the seals are anchored using a single seal, which is the Merkle root of a Sparse Merkle tree that references the transaction events for all the independent Registry TELs. In a Sparse Merkle tree, the seals are only stored in leaf nodes of the tree, not in intermediate nodes Sparse Merkle trees (SMTs) were originally developed for the Certificate Transparency (CT) network. Since then, various optimized versions of SMT have been developed Efficient inclusion proofs in an SMT enable a given Issuer to amalgamate all Registry transaction event seals for its bulk-issued ACDCs into a single SMT. This provides so-called herd privacy to the updates.
Bulk Issuance Continued To further strengthen herd privacy, when using blindable state Registries, the Issuer could randomly issue update events that do not change state, across all its registries, mixing updates over time and across each registry. This would ensure that enough updates are captured by each batch anchoring seal to guarantee a pre-specified level of herd privacy. A given seal in the KEL of the Issuer no longer provides a point of correlation to any other transaction event to any given registry. A given inclusion proof for one event from one Registry does not reveal inclusion for events in other Registries or correlate a given bulk-issued ACDC to any other bulk-issued ACDC using a different Registry. This amalgamation requires only one seal in the Issuer's KEL. Using an optimized SMT algorithm enables an Issuer to provide efficient inclusion proofs for an amalgamated SMT of all transaction update events across all Registries for all bulk-issued ACDCs to all Issuees.
More Bulk Issuance When using blindable state update events in these Registries, then the ACDC itself is not viewable by a 3rd party. Because the SMT provides herd privacy with respect to which Registries with their transaction event updates belong to which bulk-issued sets of ACDCS, a pair of malicious 2nd parties cannot compare inclusion proofs to determine if two ACDCs belong to the same bulk-issued set. Moreover, because each ACDC in a bulk-issued set gets its own Registry, the registry database does not provide a point of correlation between two different Registries that belong to the same bulk-issued set of ACDCs. Therefore, a given disclosure of a bulk-issued ACDC does not directly disclose any points of correlation between malicious 2nd parties.
Three Party Information Sharing and Leakage Model Information is Shared between two parties. Third party observers may obtain information: Indirectly as meta-data about the sharing interaction via leakage of the channel. Directly from either of the first two parties and/or their supporting infrastructure including intermediaries. Surveillance: privacy is when third parties have no knowledge of who is sharing information confidentiality is when third parties have no knowledge of what was shared. intermediary third party first party —————— 3/ second party first prty second party ‘ support support
Privacy requires accountability Second parties to repeated interactions can correlate the first parties Any interaction system that does not enable first parties to hold second parties accountable is fundamentally incompatible with privacy
How to enforce accountability?