Papers

ACDCs for Delegable Authorization Solving broken delegation chain problems EVACG, Agentic Al, and yet more bulk issuance {-\ R sl D i~ amuel M. Smith Phl , s s o KERI https://kericonf.com https://keri.foundation FOUNDATION

Tradespace Mitigations Perpetual Identity Pepetually Verifiable Issuances Control over Context Disclosure, Presence, & Usage

. Using ACDCs Graph Fragment edgels) e, 398 PrOPertes | orex fnode) I~ 1 e properes [ J Veriex L Perpetually Verifiable Issuances L Each Fragment is Separably Authenticatable Delegable Attenuable Aggrable Revocable Transferable Authority High Fidelity Modeling of Real World Authority Structures

Bridging s oruin Tt Do st Do st Do st e [ Patesnernet Pt nhrnet Pam—1 - O 8 - O 8 - O 8 Moving Trust Across Trust Domains Perpetua Trust Bridga Eppomas TustDorsin i [ — [y . [, o 8 - > o 8 ACDC perpetual identity — perpetual issuances — lossless trust transfer (KERI Suite) ephemeral identity = ephemeral issuances — lossy trust transfer (DNS/CA, OAuth/OIDC) ACDC lossless conveyor of trust — bridging ephemeral trust domains eliminates recursive privilege escalation attack vulnerabilities

Middle = i L > / ! Middle b - | Midde L\m 'm/ P Edge | & [ TMdde s Nidde » — -+ End | Edge —~ P g B . T B b data data Il — With KERI, each AID controller is its own identity provider Keys-at-the-Edge (KATE) = each edge self-authenticates No third-party 1dPs, no relying parties, no trusted intermediaries

Authorization Authorization to access a resource is granted by the resource's controller (authority) Each Issuer in an ACDC graph may be both a resource authority and an edge. Each authority or aggregable authority can authorize access to its resources via an ACDC Mutually authenticated edge (accessor) and authority prevent impersonation attacks - ‘7‘\1 g — o b Vot L . J . el Edge Verifiable Access Control (EVAC)

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Agentic Control Agent as a verifiable authorized delegate of a natural person or legal entity Agent has its own AID Realizes the original meaning of the word agent ACDC mechanisms are the same for Al, person, or entity agents. Multi-sig enables thresholded group agents Maybe regulations should require attributes that indicate the type of agent. (Al vs person)

Edge Verifiable Agentic Control (EVAC)

Autonomous Underwater Vehicles ’ - & - | e l'"r.r 7/'/‘“‘”» e ..’,;’ 4

PHYSICAL SECURITY OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE gt [ 1 P L & o -

Shipboard & Building Automation ’, \ | it AL g G S S Bk ———— e e i ¥ By

Decision Trajectory RL Generative Al Pattern Centric Reasoning Gonaralor St Generto | Generalr| Generalor|_Tlec0ry e e e - Probem [ protm |-+ Decison Model Synlnesizer = 00+ Gl { f Adapt Acquira ‘ Augment Patter Box Staleol DTG i Aot ndGrometc Crite Patem Generto| | Patem Generalor | GE"‘.’"“{‘ Patem Gereralor Problem—| Synthesizer paten Generator| | Pattem Generator ‘Palwmsl

Multi-Constraint Based Reasoning Components [ - e E (;.L P \ Do b — consn \ ™~ el T o - | /\— - osen o 0 J k

Staged Generative Automated Reasoning =i SRl Pt i, v e - e I =i - =

t S = = &

o Edge Verifiable Access Control (EVAC) ( AcDC vt 4w i W s a e ¢ o e Issuance Registry Version | Type | SAID | UUID | Issuer AID | Registry | Schema Attribute | Edge | Rule J _' Usage Registry SAID | UUID | Issuee AID | Registry = Resource Map route1 | capabiliies1 route2 | capabilities2 Attribute section could convey a policy engine rule set .

Issuance Registry of EVAC Authorization - S N e— i T 0 oty v 500 % = \NVa B cme e 5O o ]| [ Y s Ear e S—&T=gre 1T ET

Usage Registry of EVAC Authorization lssuee | Presentation [ yerer | Issuanas Regisry | ersn T 4D U ser D Regsy Srera o e e J ACDC. ’7 T o T Rt s — posonzton o a i | s [ e =) sesnaion " 0 € [0 o A ACDC ssuse Presentstin sats i veitsbly bound o Issuee s ey stte despte ofebrs P e et o [ e T e o | see | <0 | e | o il e | 2] e 4 s oo Sea o Ui | s

. . Reversion of Delegation

Revocable delegated authority problem: When a delegatee's authority to issue authorizations is revoked, what is the status of any authorizations/entitlements issued before the authority was revoked? How can a validator securely verify the status of prior valid issuances from a chain-of- authority when the chain is subsequently broken?

Version Edg | Ruo

‘ Issuee AID Version | Type | SAID | UUID | Issuer AID | Registry Schema| Atribute | Edge | Rule

o o . Bound Blinded ACDC Registry Recovation Vs Tpe | SAD U0 s D Ragty|Scara Aot Ec | Rt S i . PRI s o o Verton. Tpe |54 | WU ke AD Rty Scura ot e i | v gy 11 e — [Ep— o o [ = 5 S e x| [ oSy o o Ton | [Ty | e G5 | [Tl o v | e Enrmr=ecy S s ] A B T + s e im0 ey gy [ [y o s [ | ey | BN ey =y Sy e Y e e 3 T ) = S ey =g B o mere S e et e e T we T |-olwa | -0 oo e [5] Soc e nr . ) Breaking the chain-of-authority while preserving validity of prior valid issuances

Bound Blinded ACDC Registry Authority Reversion [Yorn] e 540 [ sior w0 | ety st e e isiceAD | T GondBiad s ok 3548) ) vrsn| Tyse SAD (U s D Regoty| Schera e Esge Rk B D A D | Sem | e Bt | e B D T — i S o 1 owe o pum | |[ stz o | et V] e || R ol el T“-‘rfl e e oo s s e 0 [ oo [ ot 0oy e ¢ w1 w0 [k | ,W‘: .T‘yr, W ,fi‘m R W ottt | 9[- 00w o | et 2] 9 o bl {80 wo et | FE S P B s S ey ey ey o S Y o o [t | 8 0 WD [dc [ wwet 9 (8 fam] O o o [ Reverting authority to delegator when delegatee's authority is revoked

Transfer Registry Replace the controller of registry without reverting the authority to delegator Key rotation can already transfer control of AID and hence registry to new controllers New registry transfer xfr event to transfer control of registry only. T GwsemweesmEme | | ReeShadiews Sevpd PR w PR T T (200 00 cocsa | Sl | o EnntsH | senEvn 540 | ‘ orsn] T 54 sur D gty s P Do D Rl et | e R P i I S o e s ||| e [ P A By = BESSe i e i R T AT e v ] | a0 0 e b e R e o p— B e S eI o [ felsoumle) v o |

ACDC Bulk Issuance with full cryptographic unlinkability validator to validator The UUIDs in each member of a bulk-issued set are derived using an HDKey algorithm that includes a shared secret salt, the member index, and the UUID index. Each member of a bulk-issued set has a unique AID and unique keys derived using an HDKey algorithm that includes a non-shared private salt, a shared secret salt, and the member index. When using independent registry bulk-issued ACDCs, the total number of registries for a given set of bulk-issued ACDCs typically equals the number of members in that set. Alternatively, a given Issuer could use one blinded state tel for multiple different ACDCs issued to the same issuee, thereby providing herd privacy of usage and state across a set of issuances.

ACDC Example

Cal Registry Inception CalIssued ACDC

[ s ACDCEARCARTSONARDS. ", s RCCRACAASON. 475 "EPolah_NE2VCaZOFETROTWKPGE KUPHASUL GYLIZDN' 4 ELFTegPUCALTGRAGOKdSaPELOg s —THukT", e ——————— [N ——— OISO T AU, e vt oo oD T e, 15h2 B AGU AT qoDSD274 e TAGKDLFHGRHALL G, "at7: "2025-07-04T17:532:00.008000+00:00"

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4 KIS AP SO U ZGRZFBR IO

Cal Issued Most Compact ACDC o " ETFTegPUCAITIORENSGEKHGAPELDg - 2NKATT-TeHAT ™, i o vonztonare . . S TEPLORA_NEPVCO20RCTFOKPCE IUPHAS L GVL 70N ansta o n part WS NGT be Shared with any other snbiy besiden the s MK AGLF0CT0-ATGL- KIBDSD224 e TAGNQLENGRHATLEY, ntendsd recipienc.” "3 EKTOSCURYyKGUPRYA SSATFaRUTSZGHIXIFbEZIONL", ; e ENEfomAYgoALEETONZUKTYCNSHS T 23] 0CuY U )

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ACDC Selective Disclosure Example Aggregate Section Blinded Aggregate Element List . [rT—————— TR SO Ry VO 0 ¢ ET2Uw 12K s-bOWEEreOhE-W205XrOST-QCYMUXSVA" , " "EL2Twi12Krs bDugEr eahEh 205 KrOnSTQUyMKSUAY "EC-U18URKXS 2t fidp_j2HHr L1I5qGALYHEZrg6-GHR" , “u": "OABHYZR]c3BLYIdvemtyYXew", EKYLUTpDXNTOU ] SdaNOTSpLpBokOKW3mAbE-MTKS00_C" BRI —— ) 3 € AGID = H(C(a. for alL 4 in {0, ..., N})), where it HECULOURGE P2 1 LIsqtGa T 85 IR e e e “ut: "OABhY2R]c3BLYIdvemtyYXCx", C is the ordered serialization operator. “score": 96 This aggregate AGID makes a blinded cryptographic commitment i} Lo a11 TS i the Liee Tars o o] { AT “ENSAA4 FTNMOMAKMMMY rSHOHWMLRLybES0IEVDOgKLAXx" 4, SERYLUTPDRITouS SAaNOTSpLPGOKORY3A b HTHSR0_C* s TOABRY2RICIBSaveaty ey ) )

ACDC Selective Disclosure Example ... Selectively Disclosed Aggregate Section o . NS4 IO e SHOAHLRLy SO E VgL 4 L2 12K -5OwgEraOnER-H20SA ORST-GE ST, " TR Sty VX, [ ——— N TEC VUISURBE oSS HEZ O, [T, ERYLUTYDANTu] SAaNOTSpLoGoHORmADGHTKSOD_C )

[ acoc Ve w o m s e [Versan | Tpe | SAD UL sser AD Ry Schemal Atite Edpe Ruke Rogty ncaption Event ) ) Regsty Binded Updsle Even oup) [ A ok ) P R T P R S @ woow s Veson| Ty | SWD WD umrAD SN D] Ve | Tye | SAD Regsy SN pro | Daotne s || || 810 | wp [ acocsan | s i . Binded State Registy (TEL) fssuer Key Event Log (KEL) | ACDC RegistrariObserver Transacton . SN Event KeySta EventSedls ACDC Stae Regtry o T oept | ot Transaction Event Log (TEL) ool o | et | SN Bt BLD 1| meract | NoChange | sea o v | . .| Binded Atnute Blocks (8ABs) _ 2 | iteract | NoChange | seal 1 | Upsate | .. ] 8UD [ WU | empty | ampty - 3| Rowte | crange | seal 2 [Upsate | .. ‘ BUD [ uu | AcDC | issued .4 | teract | NoChange | seal 3 | ptate | . - ‘ BUD [ UUD | ACDC | issued 5| Roste | Change | sea 4 Ve | . ‘ BUD [ UUID | AGDC | revoked 6| Roate | Change | Sea 5 | Uptate| .. — BLD | UUID | AGDC | revoked